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IMPOSSIBLE CHOICES: BALANCING SAFETY AND 
SECURITY IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REPRESENTATION 
Camille Carey and Robert Solomon* 
Domestic violence victims often face the impossible choice between physical safety 
and financial security.  State intervention can offer some protection to victims, but 
enlisting the criminal justice system through reporting domestic violence or 
restraining order violations can have drastic financial consequences.  Involving the 
state is likely to lead to sanctions for the abuser which would ultimately deprive the 
victim of child support, alimony, and other financial support, which may be the 
totality of the victim’s financial resources. To avoid this result, many victims refuse 
to enforce court orders intended to maximize their safety. This article examines the 
context in which victims must “choose” between physical safety and financial 
security and the lawyer’s difficult position when a client prioritizes financial 
stability.  Using a compelling case study that exemplifies this impossible choice, the 
article examines the role of economic dependence in victim decision-making; 
reasons why victims avoid protections offered by the criminal justice system; issues 
of capacity, competence, and the Rules of Professional Responsibility in representing 
victims; the different models of client-centered lawyering and cause lawyering; and 
recent social science work on the ability to predict future domestic violence based 
on current behavior.  The authors view this through the lens of law school clinical 
programs, and the experiences of students who work on the cases and what 
limitations, if any, there are to clinical representation when the client trades safety 
for economic stability.   
   
INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, we co-taught a Domestic Violence Clinic at Yale Law School. 
Each week, students went to a local domestic violence advocacy center located in a 
beautiful, old Victorian house in a nearby neighborhood in New Haven, Connecticut, 
where they met prospective clients, sitting at a dining room table under a chandelier 
in what had once been an upscale dining room.   
* Camille Carey is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of New Mexico 
School of Law.  Robert Solomon is a Clinical Professor of Law at the University of 
California Irvine School of Law.  The authors wish to thank Catherine Fisk, Jane 
Stoever, the faculty at the University of New Mexico School of Law, and participants 
at the Tenth International Clinical Legal Education Conference.  Professor Carey 
also thanks Erin Joyce, KC Manierre, and Doreen Jameson.  Professor Solomon 
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Our clinic followed a holistic model in which the clinic students represented 
victims of domestic violence in a full range of civil legal problems, including family 
law, immigration, tort actions against abusers, mortgage foreclosure, consumer, 
landlord-tenant, and tax matters.  In our practice, we found that many clients were 
forced to balance the issue of physical abuse with the threat of severe financial stress.  
The case study we present in this article is not unique. Many of our clients were loath 
to enforce existing restraining orders or criminal protective orders, fearing that 
enforcement would result in incarceration of the abuser, which would interrupt 
financial support. These pressures were particularly severe for victims with minor 
children.  
We analyze this situation through the lens of one clinic case – examining 
the role of economic dependence in victim decision making; reasons why victims 
avoid protections offered by the criminal justice system; issues of capacity, 
competence, and the Rules of Professional Responsibility in representing victims; 
the different lawyering models of client-centered lawyering and cause lawyering; 
and recent social science work on the ability to predict future domestic violence 
based on current behavior.  We also examine the clinical experiences of students who 
work on these challenging cases, and what limitations, if any, there are to clinical 
representation when a client trades safety for economic stability. This is a wide-
ranging analysis, and we appreciate that we raise more questions than we answer, 
but we are looking for ways to better inform representation of clients in dangerous 
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THE CASE STUDY 
Sarah had been married to her abuser for 19 years and had two minor 
children, ages 10 and 15, when we met her.  During the marriage, Sarah had never 
been away from home overnight without her husband Tom, although he had taken 
several trips with girlfriends.  Her husband was extremely controlling. She was not 
permitted to work or learn a trade.  He owned a business, had substantial earnings, 
built a house, paid all the bills, and doled out household money in modest amounts.  
The business was labor-intensive and was entirely dependent on his ability to bid on 
public contracts and perform strenuous physical labor. If he did not work, the income 
stream would end.  
Sarah’s husband beat her frequently. On two occasions, she took pictures 
of her black eyes and bruises.  The only time she went to a doctor, she gave a false 
account of the cause of her injuries.  She was afraid to take any action that could lead 
to her husband’s arrest. Her main concerns were that she be able to pay the mortgage 
and household bills and continue to maintain her children’s home and lifestyle. 
Two years before we met her, Sarah prepared a pro se divorce complaint. 
Connecticut has an unusual procedure, in which a complaint is served before being 
filed with the court. When Sarah served her husband in their home, by handing him 
a copy, she was afraid of physical violence. Instead, he looked at the papers, tore 
them in half, told her she was not getting a divorce, and left the house. She felt 
trapped, but assumed that her husband was correct. She believed there was no way 
she could pay for an attorney and there was no way she could get the divorce on her 
own.  It was only after she contacted a domestic violence hotline that she learned that 
she might be able to receive free legal services. 
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We represented Sarah for three years. During that period, the only time she 
was inconsolable was when her husband was arrested, which happened when a 
neighbor reported a domestic dispute at Sarah’s home.  She told us that the one thing 
she could not allow was for her husband to go to jail.  She could put up with anything 
so long as she could provide for her children, and the only way she could do that was 
for her husband to keep working. Although the court had entered restraining orders 
and, due to a third party complaint, a criminal protective order, Sarah refused to 
enforce those orders.1 
In a remarkably successful multi-day divorce trial in 2009, the court 
awarded Sarah over 50% of her husband’s income for child support and alimony, as 
well as 100% of the equity in the marital home, valued at $350,000. The evidence 
was quite compelling. As just one example, Sarah testified that one morning, on 
awakening after a beating the night before, she was exhilarated when she looked in 
the mirror, because she had only one black eye, when she expected two. 
Family lawyers reading about a “remarkably successful” result in a 
domestic violence case will probably smile to themselves, and ask “then what 
happened?” Even before the end of the trial, we knew that compliance was unlikely. 
At a recess during the last day, when things were not going well for the defendant, 
we saw him huddled with his brother, who then made a series of telephone calls. 
They conducted their business openly, with an occasional smirk for our benefit. It 
was clear that they were planning something, and equally clear that they wanted us 
to be worried about it. When our client got home, most of her furniture was missing. 
1 We use the term “restraining order” to refer to civil restraining orders – sometimes 
referred to as orders of protection or protective orders.  We use the term “protective 
order” to refer to orders by criminal courts – sometimes called orders of protection, 
protective orders, and conditions of release. 
 
5  IMPOSSIBLE CHOICES  
 
In one sense, we were relieved that the plan was limited to possessions, but we filed 
a motion for contempt the next morning.  The problem was resolved when the older 
son, now 17, drove to his father’s house, convinced his father to help him load the 
furniture on a truck, and brought it home. 
 At trial, the judge had issued a new restraining order, on her own motion, 
noting that this was the first time in her twelve years on the bench she had issued a 
restraining order without an application. An earlier restraining order had expired, and 
Sarah did not want a new order, having experienced panic when her husband was 
arrested for violating the order.   
 Tom continued his attempts to control Sarah. He violated the restraining 
order on a regular basis. He came to the house frequently. Sarah refused to take any 
action to enforce the orders. He  failed to pay alimony and child support, and we 
were in court on contempt motions on many occasions, always seeking compliance 
with the financial orders, but never raising the restraining order violations. Usually 
he showed up at court with a check. Once he brought forty $100 bills. Eventually, 
the Court scheduled monthly hearings, requiring that he keep current on payments.  
At a post-judgment contempt hearing for failure to pay child support and 
alimony, the defendant described a conversation he had with Sarah at the marital 
home, noting that he had frequent conversations with her at the house.  The judge 
was livid, and said she should throw him in jail until he learned the meaning of a 
court order.  She suggested that we might need a public defender for the 
unrepresented defendant, a sure sign that she was considering jail time. We expected 
this issue to arise, and the students were prepared. They found themselves arguing, 
strenuously and effectively, that the court should issue additional monetary 
sanctions, but not incarceration.   
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We had warned Sarah that the restraining order violations were likely to be 
disclosed. Sarah remained adamant that she wanted to enforce the financial orders, 
but not the restraining order. In fact, the mortgage was in arrears and without access 
to support and alimony payments, a mortgage foreclosure was imminent. 
The judge expressed fear for Sarah’s safety, a fear that we had lived with 
for over two years, with constant self-doubts about our failure to enforce the 
restraining orders.  We had discussed this as a class and as a litigation team. We had 
the benefit of consultation with a psychiatrist specializing in domestic violence 
issues, social workers who consulted with Sarah, victim advocates, and a prosecutor 
assigned to domestic violence prosecutions. In the end, the students and the authors 
agreed that the choice was the client’s, not ours. When the judge raised her concerns, 
the students explained and advocated for the client’s position.  The judge looked 
surprised, and took a recess. When she returned to the bench, the judge allowed the 
defendant to remain free and to continue working. 
The defendant continued to violate restraining and protective orders and 
Sarah continued in her insistence that she wanted us to enforce the financial orders 
but to do everything we could to keep her now ex-husband out of jail. Ultimately, he 
came to the house one day when Sarah’s friend was visiting. When the friend told 
him to leave, the defendant told the friend to mind his own business and pushed him, 
causing him to crash into a bookcase and hurt his shoulder. Someone called the 
police, they came, and the defendant was arrested. After a lengthy plea bargain, he 
pled to five violations of restraining orders and protective orders, and was sentenced 
to four years imprisonment.  
 
THE STUDENTS’ PERSPECTIVE 
7  IMPOSSIBLE CHOICES  
 
 When we started writing this paper, we contacted Mary Adkins and 
Elizabeth Tullis, the Yale Law School students who represented Sarah throughout 
the case study described in this paper.  Yale Law School permits first-year law 
students to enroll in a clinic, and Mary met Sarah at the outreach site a few weeks 
into the spring semester of her first year of law school.  Elizabeth worked at Yale’s 
Legal Services Office during the summer between her first and second years of law 
school and, as part of her responsibilities, represented Sarah throughout the summer.  
Both Mary and Elizabeth continued to represent Sarah throughout their second and 
third years of law school. (We appreciate that the luxury of having the same students 
work with a client for over two years is unusual, but we do not think that changes the 
issues.) 
 After an initial discussion about this paper, Elizabeth wrote us to offer an 
extraordinary g-chat that she had with Mary during the representation.  The content 
has been edited slightly for length, but the words are entirely theirs: 
 
Mary:  Tom [husband] comes over a lot, according to Steve [Sarah’s friend]. Steve 
was like “He has to go to jail to get his attention.” 
Elizabeth: Steve saw him come over? Was Sarah there when Tom came over? 
Mary: Yes and she hid upstairs. He has a key. 
Elizabeth: Tom came in the house? Did Sarah get the locks changed? 
Mary: Yes but it doesn’t matter  
Elizabeth: Did you talk to Bob or Camille about any of this? 
Mary: No, not yet 
Elizabeth: Ok, Maybe Monday or Tuesday. We will have the opportunity to tell 
Judge Swienton about this. 
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Mary: I don’t think he has the order yet. Whether or not Sarah wants Tom to go to 
jail, something has to change in the way she’s been dealing with this, or else Tom 
simply won’t stop. He won’t stop. 
Elizabeth: I wonder if we could ask for financial sanctions. Sarah really might need 
to get used to the idea of him being in jail for a while. We're just no longer in a place 
where we can use this to get assets divided, etc. 
Mary:  I think Judge Swienton is smart and caring 
Elizabeth: But even Judge Swienton is going to lose patience at some point and be 
like, if he keeps doing these things, and she wants him to stop, he needs to face the 
consequences. I just feel like in this case, I am really walking a line between serving 
what Sarah “wants” and giving her good legal advice, honest legal advice, about 
what her options are and good practical advice, responsible advice, about what I think 
she should do, legally 
Mary: I think we’ve told her what she has to do legally. She’s not doing it. 
Elizabeth: I feel like there’s a certain point in this case, though, where I can’t 
honestly be asking for a TRO [temporary restraining order]2 that she won’t enforce. 
Or, there’s not anything I can do if she won’t enforce it. By not allowing us to report 
violations we’re not serving her interests, —at least if we think that subjective 
assessments of interest in cases like Sarah’s are not all there is. If Sarah thinks that 
everything would be fine if she took Tom back, that that was what she wanted, would 
we be serving her interest by facilitating that? Or by, say, transferring property to 
2 As we mentioned earlier, the previous temporary restraining order had expired and 
Sarah did not want it extended. The students reminded her frequently that we could 
get another restraining order, but Sarah was consistent in her objections. At the time 
of this conversation, however, the restraining order issued by the Court at trial was 
in place. 
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Tom? I don’t know, I guess I’ve just been feeling really frustrated, to some extent 
with Sarah herself. 
Mary: I mean I think this is the fundamental question in DV work, right? 
Mary: But what she’s asking from us in this particular kind of instance is not action 
but inaction, not pushing the violation in front of the court, which is a passive kind 
of facilitating I realize, but it’s more palatable to me. 
Elizabeth It’s making Tom think she won’t enforce. 
Mary: Yeah I know. I mean it makes me really annoyed 
Elizabeth: It just feels very hypocritical, when our whole case was premised on “he’s 
so abusive and he needs to be away from her.” 
Mary: I know.  I asked her today if she felt scared of him and she said no, not right 
now.  I said, well he has the key to the house, you know he’s going to change his 
tune at any point and he could hurt you. 
Elizabeth: And if at some future point, she does want to enforce, and report him, say 
coming to the house, he’ll go to court and say “she’s just mad at me for something 
else – I’ve been coming to the house all the time and she hasn’t complained.” Judge 
Swienton TOLD Sarah not to have contact with him at the hearing. 
Mary: I’m not sure she would have told me today, except Steve was there and he 
said it. 
Elizabeth: I just feel weird going to Judge S and asking her to enforce child support, 
say, but refusing to bring up the other contempt. It suggests that Sarah, like Tom, is 
being selective in her respect for the orders. I know that’s not exactly what it is... but 
it doesn’t feel right to me, when we put on such a dramatic DV case and emphasized 
that this was about getting him out of her life, to tolerate him staying in it in such 
blatant ways. Ethically (not legally ethically, just ethically) it is getting to me. 
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Mary: I still think there are ways of approaching this that reconcile at least to some 
extent her understandable financial fears and his violations of the TRO. It isn’t just 
that she’s being irrational. She’s legitimately scared about his incarceration. I mean, 
scared for legit reasons. 
Elizabeth: No, but she’s not being particularly respectful towards the legal orders, 
Mary: Well, right, but they are orders that she asked for. 
Elizabeth: Or to the legal framework her case assumed when we decided to present 
DV evidence at trial and ask Judge S to rule on it. It would be different if we had not 
gotten all those financial orders etc. on the basis of the DV. 
Mary: Because those aren’t the priority in her life. She’s thinking about her priorities 
which I think are reasonable to a certain extent. 
Elizabeth: But Tom’s violation of the RO [restraining order] is a criminal act—
maybe that’s part of the reason this is bothering me.  Because literally, legally, by 
imposing the RO, Sarah was involving the state, and making it the state’s interest too 
Mary:   Well she certainly picks and chooses. 
Elizabeth: I guess, maybe, I’ve just sort of internalized the basic premise of the 
civil/criminal distinction, which is that once you enter the criminal law system, it’s 
not just the interest of the victim, but of society that is at issue. Going into the system, 
you marshal the resources of the state to protect you, but you also cede some control 
of the case to the State. 
Mary: I think you really hit the nail on the head when you told her that she can’t 
have someone to keep mowing the lawn but not beating her up. Her lifestyle WILL 
change.  I don’t think she’s accepted that. 
Elizabeth: I know. Like she says she’s trying to, but I feel like she’s saying that to 
please us.  
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Mary: Steve said that there were 30 bags of trash in the garage because Tom kept 
saying he’d send the truck via Little Tom to pick up the garbage, but now it’s been 
weeks and Steve is like, “I'm going to have to get a UHaul” and their point was that 
Tom is so controlling. 
Elizabeth: Can’t Sarah just pay for the trash pickup now, since she has money. 
Mary: But they took for granted that she was relying on this promise as if it’s still 
Tom’s duty to remove the trash 
Elizabeth: Which it’s not. It’s complicated. 
Mary: I don’t think anyone thinks of it as NOT his house 
Elizabeth: I wish I didn’t feel so frustrated.   
Mary: Yeah well it’s ok, we’ll figure something out. 
 
THE PROBLEM 
Our case study raises several issues.  What does client-based lawyering 
mean in such a context?  It is easy to say that we take direction from the client, but 
does it matter that the client is placing herself in danger of serious harm or death, not 
to mention using our services to facilitate an ongoing violation of court orders and a 
criminal protective order? 
The question of the limits of a lawyer’s advocacy on behalf of a domestic 
violence victim has gone largely unexamined.  Lawyers who work with domestic 
violence victims regularly represent clients who continue to be subjected to physical 
and sexual violence.  These clients might still be in a relationship with the abuser or 
may have intentional or unintentional contact with a former partner.   The abuser 
continues to perpetrate abuse and the victim, based on the abuser’s prior conduct, 
knows that she is likely to suffer further abuse.  The lawyer often knows of the 
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ongoing abusive conduct, although the client does not always disclose this 
information to her attorney.3  The ongoing abuse can range greatly in its severity, 
from minor pushing to lethal violence.  We ask if there is a point at which a lawyer 
should or can reconsider his or her role in representing the client, especially when 
the lawyer’s advocacy increases the likelihood of the client’s exposure to violence.  
We are particularly concerned with the lawyer’s limits (if any) when the client is 
making decisions that put her at risk of harm. 
We view this question through two important, but separate, queries in 
examining the lawyer’s role and possible limits—the level of violence and the type 
of advocacy requested.  First, there might be a level of violence to which the client 
is exposing herself that would cause a lawyer to reconsider representation of the 
client.  Most domestic violence attorneys are accustomed to representing clients who 
experience ongoing low or mid-level violence.  A typical domestic violence caseload 
often also includes some ongoing high-level violence. At what level of violence, if 
any, does the lawyer start to question whether the client’s directions accurately 
represent her interests?  Does the lawyer pause when the abuser uses or poses the 
risk of extreme violence or potentially lethal violence?  Or does the lawyer continue 
advocacy regardless of the risk to the client?  We are concerned when the client is 
voluntarily exposing herself to a high risk of harm, but it is not clear how we should 
best inform our decision about representation when the risk arises.   
Second, the client may request that the lawyer engage in advocacy that may 
expose the client to additional risk of abuse, which might lead the lawyer to 
reconsider representation.  For instance, a client may request that the lawyer file a 
3 See Pauline Quirion, Why Attorneys Should Routinely Screen Clients for Domestic 
Violence, 42BOSTON BAR J. 12, 13 (1998). 
 
13  IMPOSSIBLE CHOICES  
 
motion to vacate a civil restraining order so that the client may have contact with the 
abuser, or the client may ask that the attorney expand representation to represent the 
client and the abuser jointly.  The focus of this paper and the issue presented by our 
case study is when the client asks the lawyer to advocate that the perpetrator not be 
prosecuted for an incident of domestic violence or violating a restraining order or a 
protective order, even when the failure to prosecute will almost certainly allow for 
additional violence.  A lawyer might refuse to provide certain types of advocacy 
when that advocacy is likely to bring the client harm.  We are interested in what types 
of assistance might create sufficient concern for the attorney that she would establish 
a boundary in the representation.  
The question is raised when the lawyer is concerned that following the 
client’s directions places the client in physical jeopardy.  In no way are we suggesting 
that the client’s directions are not rational.  To the contrary, the problem is 
accentuated or created by the fact that the client’s reasons are quite rational from one 
perspective, i.e. economics, but from another perspective place her in great physical 
danger.   
 
ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY 
In our case study, financial factors played a predominant role in Sarah’s 
decision not to report violence or restraining order or protective order violations to 
law enforcement or the prosecutors’ office.  This is not unusual.  Economic 
dependency is commonly cited as the primary reason victims do not separate from 
abusers.4  Victims are often thrown into poverty when they leave an abusive 
4 NEIL S. JACOBSON & JOHN M. GOTTMAN, WHEN MEN BATTER WOMEN, 166 
(1998). 
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relationship.5  Financial reasons often play a primary role in a victim’s decision about 
whether to separate from an abuser or seek assistance from the civil or criminal 
justice systems.  When a victim is not financially independent, separation or pursuit 
of criminal remedies can be almost impossible, and victims are almost never 
financially independent.  
Domestic violence victims are already financial disempowered simply 
because they are women.  Women experience discriminatory disadvantage in the 
paid labor force.6  Gender discrimination in employment, including hiring, status, 
and compensation,7 and lack of access to credit serve to economically disadvantage 
women.8  Women are also financially impeded in the unpaid labor force.  Women 
take significantly more time out of the paid labor market to raise children and bear 
more responsibility than men for domestic chores, including cooking, cleaning, and 
shopping.9  This unpaid labor results in significant financial loss for women.  While 
men could compensate women for their domestic labor, or women could seek 
5 Id. at 261. 
6 “In 2010, women who worked full time in wage and salary jobs had median usual 
weekly earnings of $669. This represented 81 percent of men's median weekly 
earnings ($824).” U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
WOMEN’S EARNINGS AS A PERCENT OF MEN’S IN 2010 (Jan. 10, 2012), 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2012/ted_20120110.htm. 
7 Id. 
8 Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal 
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1548 (1983). 
9 ANGELA HATTERY, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 58, 75 (2009). 
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compensation from partners for this labor under theories of implied contract10 or 
quantum meruit,11 this domestic labor remains almost wholly uncompensated.12 
 Women are also financially vulnerable because of the role of patriarchy in 
the home.  Male authority, emboldened by a culture that preferences men, tends to 
dominate in the home.13 Men often exercise male privilege in the home to urge a 
partner to opt out of the paid labor market or devote a greater amount of time to 
unpaid domestic labor.  This private exercise of patriarchy in the home combined 
with women’s unequal economic power in society creates compounded financial 
vulnerability for all women regardless of whether they are in an abusive relationship.  
 Victims are also economically disadvantaged due to the dynamics in 
domestic violence relationships.  Male authority supports the cultural norm of 
domestic violence by men against women and normalizes male violence against 
intimate partners and its consequences.14  Domestic violence relationships tend to 
10 An implied-in-fact contract is “an agreement … founded upon a meeting of minds, 
which, although not embodied in an express contract, is inferred, as a fact, from 
conduct of the parties showing, in the light of the surrounding circumstances, their 
tacit understanding.” Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592, 597 
(1923). 
11 In Latin, quantum meruit means "what one has earned."  When used in contract 
law, it definition loosely translates to “reasonable value of services.” 
12 Olsen, supra note 8 at 1539 (citing SILVIA FEDERICI, WAGES AGAINST 
HOUSEWORK (1974)).   
13 Murray A. Straus, A Sociological Perspective on the Prevention and Treatment of 
Wifebeating, in FROM BATTERED WOMEN - A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE 194, 208 (Maria Roy ed.,1977).  
14 Id. at 197-199.  The cultural norm of men hitting their intimate partners reflects a 
history of women as property and society’s perception of men’s superiority over 
women, which helps to establish a man’s superiority in individual relationships.  
Historically, men have been given the right to use force against intimate partners, 
especially in marriage.  Until the early 19th century, spousal abuse was largely 
condoned.  A husband “had the right to whip his wife, provided, he used a switch no 
larger than his thumb.” State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 60 (1874).  Retreat from state-
sanctioned spousal abuse was slow; see Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. 156, 156 (1824) 
(holding that “the husband should still be permitted to exercise the right of moderate 
chastisement, in cases of great emergency, and to use salutary restraints in every case 
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follow traditional gender roles, with the abuser being particularly attached to his male 
privilege.15  The abuser is likely to insist that his female partner carry most of the 
responsibility for “womanly tasks” like housekeeping and childcare.  He, on the other 
hand, is usually the breadwinner, with breadwinning being central to his sense of 
masculinity.16  When a victim seeks to challenge these gender roles, the abuser reacts 
through controlling or violent behavior to protect his financial dominance, reinforce 
his male privilege, or further the power imbalance in the relationship. The abuser’s 
limitations on his partner’s access to the paid labor force and education creates her 
financial dependence on the abuser.  This conduct is part of economic abuse that is 
generally present in domestic violence relationships.17  Abusers commonly prohibit 
of misbehaviour [sic], without subjecting himself to vexatious prosecutions, 
resulting in the discredit and shame of all parties concerned.”); State v. Oliver, 70 
N.C. at 61-62 (“If no permanent injury has been inflicted, nor malice, cruelty nor 
dangerous violence shown by the husband, it is better to draw the curtain, shut out 
the public gaze, and leave the parties to forget and forgive.”).  The Alabama Supreme 
Court finally declared spousal abuse to be contrary to law in 1871: “the privilege, 
ancient though it be, to beat her with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her 
face, or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities is not now 
acknowledged by our law.” Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143, 146-47 (1871).  Yet 
reprieve for spousal abuse is not just an historical aberration; the common law 
doctrine of marital rape exemptions (where a husband cannot legally rape his wife 
due to explicit exemptions for marital relationships in the rape statute) is still present 
in state laws across the country.  While categorical rape exemptions are no longer 
present, Jill Elaine Hasday notes that, even today, the marital rape can result in lighter 
sentences, additional procedural hurdles for even bringing the case, or sometimes 
only apply to a narrower range of crimes. Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: 
A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373, 1376, 1482-1486 (2000). 
15 See, e.g., David Lisak et al., Factors in the Cycle of Violence: Gender Rigidity and 
Emotional Constriction, 9 J. OF TRAUMATIC STRESS 721 (1996); M. Christina 
Santana et al., Masculine Gender Roles Associated with Increased Sexual Risk and 
Intimate Partner Violence Perpetration Among Young Adult Men, 83 J. OF URBAN 
HEALTH 575 (2006).  
16Ross Macmillan & Rosemary Gartner, When She Brings Home the Bacon: Labor-
Force Participation and the Risk of Spousal Violence Against Women, 61 J. 
MARRIAGE & FAM. 947, 948 (1999). 
17 See generally Susan L. Pollet, Economic Abuse: The Unseen Side of Domestic 
Violence, 83 N.Y. ST. B.A. J. 40, 40-41 (2011). 
 
17  IMPOSSIBLE CHOICES  
 
their partners from pursuing an education or employment, and abusers usually 
control the financial resources of the relationship.18 
For a victim with dependent children, few or no job skills, and little or no 
employment experience, leaving an abusive relationship is extremely difficult.19  The 
role of class in a victim’s analysis of whether to separate from an abuser is complex.  
Some victims will find financial security in the most basic of shelter and subsistence.  
Others associate financial security with a home in a good neighborhood, high quality 
education for their children, nice cars, vacations, and other comfortable amenities.20  
Regardless, separation is likely to force a victim into a lower quality of life or 
poverty.  She may go from living in a house to living in an apartment or from living 
in an apartment to living in a domestic violence or homeless shelter.  She may have 
to move to a less desirable neighborhood, leave a job, or give up her childcare.21  She 
is also likely to lose her ability to buy necessary items for herself or her children and 
may be disconnected from her support network.22 Because of the many effects of 
economic deprivation, she may risk losing custody of her children through child 
protective services.  
18 Angela Littwin, Coerced Debt: The Role of Consumer Credit in Domestic 
Violence, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1-47 (2012). It is important to note that some abusers 
lack financial resources.  He may be unemployed or underemployed, lack education 
or job skills, or be a low-income wage earner.  If he is attached to rigid gender roles, 
he can be particularly frustrated about failing to provide for his family.  The abuser’s 
frustration, insecurity, or sense of failure related to his employment status and 
financial stability can fuel or provide an excuse for violence.  If he is feeling a lack 
of control in his financial situation, he may turn to exercising more control in his 
intimate relationship through violence. Suzanne Prescott & Carolyn Letko, Battered 
Women: a Social Psychological Perspective, in BATTERED WOMEN: A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 72, 74, 89 (Maria Roy ed., 1977). 
19 Prescott & Letko, supra note 18 at 84.  
20 JILL DAVIES ET AL., SAFETY PLANNING WITH BATTERED WOMEN: COMPLEX 
LIVES/DIFFICULT CHOICES, 34-35 (1998). 
21 Id. at 35. 
22 Id. 
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Even for victims who have left their abusers, state intervention can cause 
additional hardship.  An abuser can lose his job or the prospect of employment due 
to arrest, prosecution, or incarceration.  The victim is then unable to receive any 
financial support from the abuser, be it child support, alimony, or other financial 
contributions.  Research has shown that victims often seek to opt out of criminal 
justice protections because of their limited economic resources.23  Victims deliberate 
whether “they can afford to prioritize prosecution over other more immediate 
concerns such as food, employment, and childcare.”24  For many women, the 
incarceration of their abusers means destitution and homelessness for their families.  
In addition, many victims may not want to report domestic violence to the authorities 
so as to avoid future employment consequences for their abusers.25  In one survey of 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and victim advocates, the “overwhelming 
reason” given for victims’ reluctance to participate in the criminal system was the 
financial resources of the victim and her financial dependence on the abuser.26  One 
prosecutor estimated that victims give a financial reason for wanting to drop the 
charges in ninety-nine percent of the cases; another prosecutor estimated that victims 
23 Some scholars argue that recantation is also a product of mandatory prosecution 
policies.  When prosecutors work in a hard no-drop jurisdiction, “the battered 
woman’s preference is irrelevant, except to the extent that she helps, or does not help, 
win the prosecutor’s case.  In these situations, prosecutions are pursued against the 
batterer by forcing the woman to testify, sometimes leading to recantation, blurring, 
or rearrangement of the facts by the victim.” Linda G. Mills, Intuition and Insight: 
A New Job Description for the Battered Woman’s Prosecutor and Other More 
Modest Proposals, 7 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 183, 186 (1997). 
24 Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence 
Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 823 (2001). 
25 Kimberley D. Bailey, Lost in Translation: Domestic Violence, “The Personal is 
Political,” and the Criminal Justice System, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1255, 
1281-1282 (2010). 
26 Thomas L. Kirsch II, Problems in Domestic Violence: Should Victims Be Forced 
to Participate in the Prosecution of Their Abusers?, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 
383, 387, 392 (2001). 
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will cite financial reasons for requesting that the charges be dropped in fifty-percent 
of cases.27   
Many victims are put in the position of “choosing” between receiving 
financial support from the abuser and reporting an incident or a violation of a 
restraining order or a protective order.  An abuser who is arrested or prosecuted may 
lose wages or his employment, and an incarcerated abuser is unable to engage in 
meaningful employment.  If the victim is receiving child support or alimony, 
criminal court intervention might terminate this support as a result of penalties to the 
abuser.  The victim’s economic dependence on the abuser often makes her reluctant 
to prosecute.28  Additionally, because of financial abuse in domestic violence 
relationships and gender bias in society, victims often are not in a position to be 
financially self-sufficient.29  The involvement of the state can have serious 
consequences to a domestic violence victim’s financial stability.  The quagmire 
created by state intervention can pit a victim’s interests in financial security against 
her interests in safety.   
We do not suggest that a victim is truly “choosing” between economic 
security and physical safety.  The choices available to domestic violence victims are 
limited and complicated by coercion, the threat of harm, and imperfect options, and 
we use the notion of “choice” guardedly.  Our case study offers an opportunity to 
examine the “choice” of financial security over self-protection when reporting 
domestic violence incidents and violations of restraining orders and protective orders 
27 Id. at 392. 
28 Robert C. Davis et al., Research Notes, Increasing Convictions in Domestic 
Violence Cases: A Field Test in Milwaukee, 22 JUST. SYS. J. 61, 62 (2001) (citation 
omitted).   
29 Id.   
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would negatively impact a victim’s financial security.  Further inquiry into criminal 
justice policies regarding domestic violence reveals why a victim might “choose” 
financial security over personal safety. 
 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND MANDATORY POLICIES 
Victims are often reluctant to enlist the assistance of the police or the 
criminal justice system because that system and its consequences are largely out of 
their control.  Reporting an incident of domestic violence can operationalize the 
criminal justice system, but so too can reporting a violation of a civil restraining 
order.  All fifty states treat violations of civil restraining orders as a criminal matter.30  
In our case study, Sarah asked us to engage in advocacy that would put a stop to 
criminal proceedings.  In one instance, she asked us to plead with the prosecutor to 
not pursue charges against Tom.  In another, she begged us to persuade the family 
court judge to not report Tom’s violation of the restraining order.  Throughout the 
relationship, Sarah claimed that her domestic violence injuries resulted from all 
manners of clumsiness so as to avoid the possibility of prosecution.  Sarah’s situation 
is hardly unusual.  Mandatory arrest and prosecution, warrantless arrest, and other 
problems with the criminal justice system lead many victims to try to “opt out” of 
criminal remedies.   
30 Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State’s Response to Domestic 
Violence, 43 WM & MARY L. .REV. 1843, 1860 (2002); see also David M. Zlotnick, 
Empowering the Battered Woman: The Use of Criminal Contempt Sanctions to 
Enforce Civil Protection Orders, 56 OHIO ST. L. J. 1153, 1194 (1995).  Individuals 
who violate civil restraining orders can also be penalized through civil or criminal 
contempt proceedings.  Id. at 1994-1995. 
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Mandatory arrest and mandatory prosecution policies drive state 
intervention in domestic violence situations in many jurisdictions.31  Mandatory 
arrest policies require law enforcement to make an arrest when there is probable 
cause to believe that domestic violence has occurred, regardless of the victim’s 
preferences.32  Mandatory prosecution policies generally require the prosecutor to 
pursue charges against the abuser if there is evidence of a crime of domestic violence 
regardless of the victim’s desire to pursue prosecution.33  Mandatory prosecution 
policies, sometimes called “no-drop policies,” are often characterized as “hard” or 
“soft” no drop policies.34  Under hard policies, given sufficient evidence the 
prosecutor proceeds regardless of the victim’s preferences, perhaps even compelling 
the victim to participate in the prosecution.35  Under soft policies, a prosecutor may 
decide to forego prosecution in certain circumstances, and victims are not forced to 
participate in the prosecution.36 Even in jurisdictions without mandatory intervention 
policies, the victim’s interests and concerns are supplanted by those of the state. 
Mandatory arrest and mandatory prosecution policies can play a substantial 
role in a victim’s decision about whether to involve police or the criminal court.  In 
a mandatory arrest or prosecution jurisdiction, if a victim reports a domestic violence 
incident or restraining or protective order violation, the state moves toward arrest 
and prosecution, even if arrest or prosecution are not favored by the victim or in the 
31 Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of 
Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1670 (2004). 
32 Coker, supra note 24, at 802 n.5, 806. 
33 Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic 
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1863 (1996); Coker, supra note 24, 
at 802 n.5, 806; Mills, supra note 23.  
34 Hanna, supra note 33; Mills, supra note 23. 
35 Hanna, supra note 33; Coker, supra note 24, at 802 n.5, 806; Mills, supra note 23. 
36 Hanna, supra note 33; Coker supra note 24 at 802 n.5, 806; Mills, supra note 23. 
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victim’s best interests.  Even in jurisdictions that do not follow mandatory arrest or 
prosecution policies, reporting an incident of domestic violence or violation of a 
restraining or protective order often will initiate state involvement.  
Policy arguments over whether mandatory policies are the right approach 
to domestic violence are heated.  Proponents of mandatory policies argue that 
mandatory policies are necessary because they: require otherwise reluctant 
prosecutors to follow through with prosecution;37 ensure uniform treatment of 
domestic violence crimes even when the victim does not cooperate or want the 
criminal case to proceed;38 remove the burden of choosing whether to prosecute from 
the victim;”39 and reduce racial discrimination in the criminal justice system by 
seeking to ensure that all perpetrators, regardless of race, are treated similarly.40 
Opponents of mandatory intervention believe that these policies do not 
serve the larger goal of ending domestic violence, deny the needs of individual 
victims, and even supplant the control of the abuser with the control of the state.41  
Opponents are concerned that these universally applied strategies: do not account for 
the reasons women stay in abusive relationships;42 ignore the “overriding financial, 
cultural, or emotional issues that plague battered women’s lives”;43 force a decision 
37 Hanna, supra note 33, at 1860. 
38 Id.  
39 Id. at 1852, 1865. 
40 Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State 
Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV 550, 564 (1999). 
41 See Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of 
Mandatory Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 
(2009); Jessica Dayton, The Silencing of a Women’s Choice: Mandatory Arrest and 
No Drop Prosecution Policies in Domestic Violence Cases, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN'S 
L.J. 281 (2003); Mills, supra note 23. 
42 Mills, supra note 23 at 187-188. 
43 Mills, supra note 23 at 185. 
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on victims without taking into account their individual needs;44 and disempower 
victims and strip them of their autonomy.45   
Laws providing for warrantless arrest in domestic violence cases also create 
situations in which cases may be prosecuted against victim wishes. Prior to the 
domestic violence movement’s legal reform efforts,46 the typical police response to 
domestic violence was to tell the husband or boyfriend to “take a walk around the 
block.”47  Police often did not have the legal authority to make an arrest at the scene 
of a domestic violence crime.48  Now all fifty states allow an officer to make a 
warrantless arrest when the officer has probable cause to believe that an abuser has 
committed a misdemeanor or violated a restraining order.49  This means that the 
criminal justice system can be operationalized even if a domestic violence victim 
does not report an incident or call the police.  A neighbor’s phone call or a police 
officer’s viewing of an incident could be enough to initiate arrest or prosecution. 
44 Id. 
45 Id.; Opponents believe that the state’s indifference to the victims themselves is 
“harmful, even violent.”  Id. at 187-188. 
46 Mandatory intervention policies are the product of years of criminal justice reform 
fueled by the domestic violence movement and feminists, with the perceived 
interests of domestic violence victims driving the reform efforts.46  This reform has 
taken place only since the late 1960s, when the battered women’s movement began 
launching concerted efforts.  “The battered women's movement was an outsider 
movement, a grassroots movement that developed from the civil rights and feminist 
movements of the 1960s. Many feminists saw battering as the product of patriarchy, 
as male control over women. . . . The movement developed shelters, safe houses, and 
alternative institutions. Groups rejected governmental funding for battered women's 
services and programs.  Despite ambivalence about the government's role in 
protecting battered women, ‘engaging with the state’ emerged as a principal strategy 
of the battered women's movement in the early 1980s and developed over the next 
two decades.” Jane C. Murphy, Engaging with the State: The Growing Reliance on 
Lawyers and Judges to Protect Battered Women, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y 
& L. 499, 500-501 (2003). 
47 Hanna, supra note 33, at 1858. 
48 Id. at 1859. 
49 Id. 
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Involving the criminal system can have other negative consequences for 
victims, including sanctions when a victim has contact with an abuser who is subject 
to a restraining order.  Victims have been held criminally liable for aiding and 
abetting an abuser in violating a restraining order when the victim has had contact 
with the abuser.50  Victims have also been held in contempt for having contact with 
an abuser when a restraining order is in effect.  One Kentucky judge held two 
different victims in contempt for having contact with an abuser subject to a 
restraining order.51  The judge fined one victim $100 and the other $200 as a penalty 
for contempt.52  Other judges in Kentucky have incarcerated women because they 
contacted their husbands when a restraining order was in effect.53   
Victims may also be compelled to participate in criminal proceedings 
against their will by subpoena, threatened incarceration, or other means.54  For 
example, in State v. Finney,55 the prosecutor subpoenaed the victim– who had been 
raped by her husband – and then threatened her with arrest if she failed to testify.  
During her compelled testimony, the victim indicated that she had been harassed and 
intimidated by the prosecutor.  She stated that she did not want to testify but that she 
50 See, e.g., Henley v. Iowa Dist. Court for Emmet Cnty., 533 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 
1995); But cf., N. Olmsted v. Bullington, 744 N.E.2d 1225 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); 
State v. Lucas, 100 Ohio St. 3d 1, 795 N.E.2d 642 (Ohio 2003);  See generally, Marya 
Kathryn Lucas, An Invitation to Liability?: Attempts at Holding Victims of Domestic 
Violence Liable as Accomplices When They Invite Violations of Their Own 
Protective Orders, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 763, 774-778 (2004).   
51 Francis X. Clines, Judge’s Domestic Violence Ruling Creates an Outcry in 




53 Stephanie Simon, Judges Push for Abused to Follow the Law, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 
2002, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2002/jan/22/news/mn-24141.   
54 See, Kirsch, supra note 26, at 402-406. 
55 591 S.E.2d 863 (N.C. 2004). 
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was afraid not to and that she believed the prosecutor would ensure she was arrested 
immediately after leaving the courtroom for her failure to testify.56  In Tejeda v. 
State,57 the trial court judge ordered the victim to remain in the courtroom in case 
the court needed her and stated, “If you leave, you’ll be in contempt of Court and I’ll 
have you put in jail.”58  The court also threatened that the court and the police would 
not assist her in the future as a result of her reluctance to testify.59  
Victims also may experience penalties or harassment from the criminal 
system for “recanting” or committing perjury.60  In State v. Spraggins, the victim 
requested that the charges be dismissed and asserted that her earlier statement about 
a domestic violence incident was false.61  The victim was subpoenaed to testify, and 
during cross-examination of the victim, the trial court stated in the presence of the 
jury, “So let me see if I’ve got this all straight.  We’re here trying this case because 
you are a liar.  Is that correct?  Do you want to answer the question yes or no?  We 
are here going through this, trying this case because you are a liar, is that correct?”62  
In State v. Hancock, the wife recanted at trial despite prior written and videotaped 
statements to the contrary.63  The trial court threatened to send her to prison for five 
years for perjury and went on to say, “So, either he goes or you go, what is it going 
to be.  You got kids?... What is it going to be? Who is going to jail, you or him?”64 
56 Id. at 865. 
57 905 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 For a discussion of the reasons victims recant, see Njeri Mathis Rutledge, Turning 
a Blind Eye: Perjury in Domestic Violence Cases, 39 N.M. L. REV. 149, 163-75 
(2009).  Professor Rutledge advocates that some victims should be prosecuted for 
perjury.  Id. at 182-94. 
61 No. 82170, 2003 WL 22971050, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App., Dec. 18, 2003). 
62 Id. at *2. 
63 No. C-030459, 2004 WL 596103, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App., March 26, 2004). 
64 Id. at *2.  
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It is no wonder that victims often try to opt out of the protections provided 
by the criminal justice system.  “Attrition dismissal rates” in domestic violence cases 
are extremely high.65  A series of studies have shown that victims fail to participate 
in criminal cases arising from domestic violence in about 60% to 80% of cases.66  
Such attrition may occur as a result of a victim dropping charges or recanting.67  
Other modes of noncooperation include failure to cooperate with the police at the 
time of law enforcement intervention, sign the complaint, meet with the prosecutor, 
and appear at court hearings.68  One study found that judges, lawyers, and other court 
personnel perceive that 56 percent of domestic violence victims will only testify if 
subpoenaed.69  These same individuals observed that thirty-one percent of victims 
change their minds about the abuser’s guilt, and thirty-one percent undermine the 
prosecution’s case.70  Experts on domestic violence – including psychologists, 
counselors, law enforcement officers, shelter employees, and victim advocates – 
regularly testify that it is common for domestic violence victims to recant.71   
65 EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE RESPONSE 87 (1996) (internal citations omitted); But see, KARIN V. RHODES 
ET AL., VICTIM PARTICIPATION IN INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE PROSECUTION: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR SAFETY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11 (2011) (finding that 
victims have a strong preference for mandatory prosecution with or without the 
victim’s participation). 
66 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 65, at 87. 
67 Id. 
68 Maureen McLeod, Research Note, Victim Noncooperation in the Prosecution of 
Domestic Assault, 21 CRIMINOLOGY, 395, 400 (1983). 
69 Jennifer L. Hartman & Joanne Belknap, Beyond the Gatekeepers: Court 
Professionals’ Self-Reported Attitudes About and Experiences with Misdemeanor 
Domestic Violence Cases, 30 CRIM. JUSTICE & BEHAV. 349, 361 (2003). 
70 Id. 
71 Douglas E. Beloof & Joel Shapiro, Let the Truth be Told: Proposed Hearsay 
Exceptions to Admit Domestic Violence Victims’ Out of Court Statements as 
Substantive Evidence, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (2002); See Audrey Rogers, 
Prosecutorial Use of Expert Testimony in Domestic Violence Cases: From 
Recantation to Refusal to Testify, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 67, 78-83, 87-91 (1998); 
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Some victims eschew criminal system involvement by trying to avoid 
intervention at all. A staggering amount of domestic violence goes unreported.  One 
study indicated that 55% of intimate violence is never reported to the police.72  
Another study found that less than 10% of seriously injured women report abuse to 
the police and even fewer report if they are subjected to but escape serious injury.73  
In yet another study, about 47% of victims tried to opt out of the criminal system 
before the case was even brought to the attention of the prosecutor’s office.74  
Victims are instead turning to the family law system where they are requesting civil 
restraining orders in droves.75  The extent to which victims realize that this civil 
remedy becomes criminal after its violation is unknown.   
The victim may not want to involve the criminal justice system because of 
inadequacies in or complications created by that system or because the system does 
not meet a domestic violence victim’s needs.76  The high rates of victim 
nonparticipation are unsettling and indicate the problematic nature of the criminal 
justice system for domestic violence victims.  If the system successfully addressed 
Jennifer Gentile Long, Explaining Counterintuitive Victim Behavior in Domestic 
Violence and Sexual Assault Cases, 1.4 THE VOICE 2-3 (2006). 
72 McLeod, supra note 68, at 400 (citing U.S. Department of Justice, Intimate 
Victims: A Study of Violence Among Friends and Relatives (1980)). 
73 Id. (citing LENORE WALKER, BATTERED WOMEN (1979)). 
74 McLeod, supra note 68, at 405. 
75 JEFFREY FAGAN, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND 
LIMITS 24 (1996) (describing civil restraining orders as “the primary source of legal 
sanction and protection for battered women”); Carolyn N. Ko, Note, Civil 
Restraining Orders for Domestic Violence: The Unresolved Question of “Efficacy”, 
11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 361, 376 (describing civil restraining orders as the “most 
attractive” remedy for domestic violence victims). 
76 Law enforcement does not always enforce protection orders, for example.  In 1984, 
Tracey Thurman was awarded $2.9 million after suing the Torrington, Connecticut 
Police Department and twenty-four city police officers on the grounds that the city's 
policy and practice of nonintervention and nonarrest [sic] in domestic violence cases 
was unconstitutional” on Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection grounds. 
Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1524 (D. Conn. 1984). 
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domestic violence, victim engagement would be much more prevalent.77  The 
criminal justice system has emerged as the primary domestic violence intervention 
strategy,78 and it is failing victims.  There is some indication that victims are now 
deterred from calling the police because of the victim’s loss of control over the 
situation.79 
Victims may avoid participating because treatment of them by judges, 
lawyers, and other court personnel further compound the inadequacies of the 
criminal system.  Victims who do not cooperate or do not separate from the abuser 
are viewed by some judges and lawyers as “pathetic, stupid, or even deserving of the 
abuse.”80  Victims who do cooperate are seen by these same actors as “vindictive, 
crazy, or falsely charging domestic violence to meet their own selfish needs.”81  
Victims also may be reluctant to cooperate because of the abuser’s control, the 
abuser’s threat of violence, or the victim’s fear of retaliation.82  The victim may be 
terrified that the abuser will harm her, family members, or loved ones if she 
cooperates.83 
77 Bailey, supra note 25 at 1281-1282. 
78 Deborah Weissman, The Personal is Political–and Economic: Rethinking 
Domestic Violence, 2007 BYU L. REV. 387, 402 (2007). 
79 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 65, at 51, 163. 
80 Hartman & Belknap, supra note 69, at 363. 
81 Hartman & Belknap, supra note 69, at 363. 
82 Kirsch, supra note 26, at 393-396.  See Laura Dugan et al., Do Domestic Violence 
Services Save Lives?, 250 NAT’L INST. OF JUST. J. 20, 24 (2003) (finding an increase 
of femicide of married white and unmarried black women and an increase in 
victimization of unmarried white women when a prosecutor pursued protective order 
violations). But cf. Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Risk Factors for Femicide in 
Abusive Relationships: Results From a Multisite Case Control Study, 93 AM. J. 
PUBLIC HEALTH 1089, 1092 (2003) (finding that domestic violence arrests decrease 
the risk for femicide). 
83 Jennice Vilhauer, Understanding the Victim: A Guide to Aid in the Prosecution of 
Domestic Violence, 27 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 953, 958 (1999); But cf., RHODES ET AL., 
supra note 65, at 10 (finding that there is not an increase in victims’ visit to the 
emergency department during or after prosecution). 
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Victims may have had negative interactions with law enforcement that 
further deter involvement.  Research has repeatedly shown that abusers are arrested 
infrequently for domestic violence incidents.84  Victims may not participate because 
they may not perceive the conduct as criminal or abusive or believe that it is a 
personal matter.85  Victims may be hindered by not understanding how the system 
works, or they may have logistical barriers to participation such as not having 
transportation, time, money, or childcare.86  They may fear that the abuser will 
retaliate by reporting the victim to child protective services and alleging abuse, 
neglect, or substance abuse.87  Victims may suffer from post-traumatic stress 
disorder created by the abuse that makes it difficult or impossible to cooperate.88   
Race, culture, and sexual orientation may also play a role in a victim’s 
decision as to whether to enlist the criminal justice system.89  Women of color may 
choose not to call the police due to racism in law enforcement or because of a 
community ethic against state intervention.90  Women of color are also less likely to 
have contact with a prosecutor, want to press charges, or want prosecution than white 
women.91  Gay, lesbian, and transgender victims may avoid the criminal system 
because of prior negative experiences with law enforcement or the courts or due to 
fear of reprisals from the system.92 
84 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 65, at 51, 53. 
85 Id. at 45. 
86 RHODES ET AL., supra note 65, at 48. 
87 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 65, at 45.   
88 Id. 
89 Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, 
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1257 (1991). 
90 Id. 
91 RHODES ET AL., supra note 65, at 7-8. 
92 See, Ruthann Robson, Lavender Bruises: Intra-Lesbian Violence, Law and 
Lesbian Legal Theory, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 567 (1990); DAVID ISLAND & 
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This paper focuses on the role of economic security in a victim’s decision-
making. We concentrate on the economic pressures that make it difficult to leave but 
recognize that financial matters represent one piece of a complicated picture, and we 
are concerned with isolating any single factor in what is often a multi-faceted 
decision.  However, other factors—including fear of separation assault, risks due to 
immigrant status, and love for or attachment to the abuser—also may feature 
prominently in a victim’s decision about whether to enforce a restraining or 
protective order or report an act of domestic violence.  At the risk of raising new 
questions that we do not attempt to answer, we briefly address issues related to 
separation assault, immigration and immigrant status, and the role of love or 
attachment. 
Separation Assault 
An abused woman may decide not to involve the criminal justice system 
because of the threat of violent retaliation by the abuser.  When a victim separates or 
decides to separate from her abuser, the risk of violence escalates.93  This “separation 
assault” is “the particular assault on a woman’s body and volition that seeks to block 
her from leaving, retaliate for her departure, or forcibly end the separation.”94  
Victims will often postpone leaving the abuser fearing this separation assault.95  
Women will only choose to separate or pursue criminal justice protections if it seems 
PATRICK LETELLIER, MEN WHO BEAT THE MEN WHO LOVE THEM: BATTERED GAY 
MEN AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (1991). 
93 Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of 
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 20 (1991); Mary Ann Dutton, The Dynamics of 
Domestic Violence: Understanding the Response from Battered Women, 68 FLA. B.J. 
24 (1994) (quoting Mahoney, supra at 94). 
94 Mahoney, supra note 93, at 6. 
95 Id. at 65-93. 
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possible or safe to do so.96  Domestic abuse is most likely to become lethal when a 
victim separates from her abuser.97  The risk of homicide to a victim cohabitating 
with an abuser intensifies after separation.98  In 56 percent of intimate partner 
femicide (or the murder of women) cases, the abuser and victim were separated on 
the day of the murder.99  Separation was the “immediate precipitating factor” in 
forty-five percent of intimate partner femicides.100  
Immigration and Immigrant Status 
 Noncitizen women may be even less likely than citizens to involve the 
criminal justice system because of cultural beliefs, language limitations, or other 
barriers.101  Immigrant women tend to feel more pressure to live up to cultural ideals 
and fear that separation is disloyal to their culture and will lead to community 
stigmatization or sanctions.102  A victim might not be able to speak or be literate in 
English, and interpretation in the woman’s language may not be available through 
96 Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression? Women's Lives, Violence, and 
Agency, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 59,73-74 (Martha Albertson 
Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994). 
97 Id. at 79. 
98 Campbell et al., supra note 82, at 1092. 
99 George W. Bernard et al., Till Death Do Us Part: A Study of Spouse Murder, 10 
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 271, 274 (1982).  In fact, a victim’s chances of 
being killed by her intimate partner increases by a factor of four when the worst 
incident of abuse in the relationship was triggered by a prior attempt by the victim to 
leave the relationship.  The odds of being murdered increase by a factor of five when 
the worst incident was triggered by an attempt to leave the abuser for another partner 
or by the abuser’s jealousy. Campbell et al., supra note 82, at 1092. 
100 Carolyn Rebecca Block, Risk Factors for Death or Life-Threatening Injury for 
Abused Women in Chicago, U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 
II-4-6, NCJ 199732 (2004).   
101 See, Edna Erez & Carolyn Copps Hartley, Battered Immigrant Women and the 
Legal System: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective, 4 W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 
155 (2003). 
102 Yvonne Amanor-Boadu et al., Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Women: Factors 
that Predict Leaving an Abusive Relationship, 18(5) VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
611, 613 (2012) (internal citations omitted). 
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the criminal justice system.103  Immigrant women also face greater financial risks in 
separating from an abusive partner.104   
Immigrant victims rarely call the police,105 in part because of possible 
immigration consequences for their non-citizen abusers.  A conviction for domestic 
violence or violating a restraining order is a removable offense, meaning that the 
abuser can be deported on that basis.106  For some victims, removal of the abuser is 
a positive development that lowers or eliminates the risk of future violence.107  
Others do not want to begin a course of conduct that may result in the abuser being 
deported.  If the abuser is the parent of the victim’s children, the victim may not want 
to sever the parent-child relationship through the abuser’s removal.  The victim may 
be receiving financial support from the abuser through child support, alimony, or 
other means, and the abuser’s deportation would mean almost certain cessation of 
that support.  Finally, for emotional reasons, the victim may not want the abuser to 
suffer such a severe penalty as removal.108   
A victim may also choose not to report abuse fearing her own adverse 
immigration consequences.109  Undocumented victims generally assume some 
103 Erez & Copps Hartley, supra note 101, at 159-160. 
104 Amanor-Boadu et al., supra note 102, at 642. 
105 Nawal H. Ammar et al., Calls to Police and Police Response: A Case Study of 
Latina Immigrant Women in the USA, 7 INT’L J. POLICE SCIENCE & MGMT 230, 236 
(2005); Leslye E. Orloff et al., Battered Immigrant Women’s Willingness to Call for 
Help and Police Response, 13 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 43, 60 (2003). 
106 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E) (1952, as amended through 2008). 
107 Orloff et al., supra note 105, at 69-70. 
108 But cf., Orloff et al., supra note 105, at 69-70 (finding that the immigration status 
of an abuser is not a factor in a victim’s decision about whether to contact the police). 
109 Orloff et al., supra note 105, at 67-68. 
109 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E) (1952, as amended through 2008). When an 
undocumented victim reports her abuse, she may be informing the authorities that 
she does not have valid immigration status — and then chances removal.  A victim 
of domestic violence might be able to seek a non-immigrant visa commonly referred 
to as the U Visa, under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (1952, as amended through 2013). 
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element of risk when interacting with law enforcement.110  Some jurisdictions, like 
Arizona, require law enforcement to verify the immigration status of any person 
suspected of being undocumented.111  While some jurisdictions do not inquire about 
the immigration status of victims,112 every time a victim interacts with law 
enforcement there is some chance that she will come to the attention of Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE).  
Love and Attachment 
While beyond the scope of this paper, love or attachment can be controlling 
factors in a victim’s decision whether to report an abuser’s behavior or terminate the 
relationship. 113  Victims are often emotionally attached to their abusers and 
sometimes do not want to see them incarcerated or punished.  These emotions can 
lead victims to continue contact or a relationship with the abuser.  Victims may 
rationalize the abusers’ behavior, attributing it to substance abuse or a troubled 
childhood.114  Reporting abusive conduct or terminating contact with the abuser may 
This status requires that the victim prove that she suffered “severe or substantial 
physical or mental abuse,” that she “possesses information concerning criminal 
activity,” and that she is “likely to be helpful to . . . authorities investigating or 
prosecuting criminal activity.”  Id.  Issuance of U-Visa certifications by law 
enforcement can vary widely from precinct to precinct. Joey Hipolito, Illegal Aliens 
or Deserving Victims?: The Ambivalent Implementation of the U Visa Program, 17 
ASIAN AM. L.J. 153, 163-164 (2010).   
110 Elizabeth M. W. Trefonas, Access to Justice for Immigrants in Wyoming, 34 WYO. 
LAW. 24, 25-27 (2011). 
111 ARIZ. REV.STAT. ANN. § 13-1509 (2010).  Commonly referred to as the “Support 
Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act” or SB 1070, which refers to the 
bill version of the law as presented to the Arizona State Senate. 
112 For example, in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F.Supp. 
755 (C.D. Cal. 1995), on reconsideration in part, 997 F.Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1997), 
the court ruled that a measure requiring law enforcement agencies to verify the 
immigration status of every arrestee who they suspected of being in the United States 
unlawfully was entirely preempted by federal law, which does not require 
investigation into immigration status. 
113 Mills, supra note 40, at 598; RHODES ET AL., supra note 65, at 50. 
114 JACOBSON & GOTTMAN, supra note 4 at 166. 
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require the victim to give up a fantasy of a healthy relationship with the abuser.115  
The role of love in a victim’s decision even can trump economic factors in a victim’s 
decision about whether to separate or report abuse.116  As one prosecutor stated, 
“[T]hey love the person.  They’re afraid that going forward will break up their 
relationship, and most of the time they don’t want to break up.”117 
Within the litany of reasons why domestic violence victims would avoid 
criminal justice interventions, financial dependence on the abuser remains the 
primary reason that victims opt out.118  Research reveals the significant financial 
impact incarceration has on families, regardless of the reason for the incarceration.  
As early as 1928, families of incarcerated individuals were found to have suffered 
financially “to the point of scarcely being able to ‘eke out an existence.’”119  Today, 
a parent’s incarceration creates significant economic deprivation to families.120  This 
deprivation is largely due to the loss of income that the incarcerated parent may have 
115 Id. 
116 HATTERY, supra note 9 at 53, 75 (“Many affluent battered women do not leave 
their abusive partners for the same reasons middle-class or poor women do not: 
because they love their partners, and because they believe they will change”). 
117 Kirsch, supra note 26, at 397. 
118 Supra pages 18-19.   
119 Donald P. Schneller, Prisoners’ Families: A Study of Some Social and 
Psychological Effects of Incarceration on the Families of Negro Prisoners, 12 
CRIMINOLOGY 402, 403 (1975). 
120 Kathleen J. Ferraro & John M. Johnson, Problems of Prisoners’ Families: The 
Hidden Costs of Imprisonment, 4 J. FAM. ISSUES 575, 588 (1983); John Hagan & 
Ronit Dinovitzer, Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment for Children, 
Communities, and Prisoners, 26 CRIME & JUST. 121, 124 (1999); Joseph Murray, 
The Effects of Imprisonment on Families and Children of Prisoners in THE EFFECTS 
OF IMPRISONMENT, 442, 442-444 (Alison Liebling & Shadd Maruna eds. 2013); 
Schneller, supra note 119, at 410; Creasie Finney Hairston, Prisoners and Families: 
Parenting Issues During Incarceration 1, 4 (2001) (working papers prepared for the 
“From Prison to Home” Conference January 30-31, 2002). 
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provided to the family but also includes lost “informal contributions” like child care, 
social support, and the purchase of toys and diapers.121   
Incarceration can compromise the well-being of remaining family members 
and require family members to make sacrifices. Custodial parents may have less time 
or money to invest in their children.122  They may be required to take on additional 
employment which results in increased child care costs.  Older children may be 
required to leave school and enter the job market to supplement household income.123  
In addition, the loss of a parent and the financial difficulties that result from 
incarceration can cause children to suffer from a range of emotional, psychological, 
and behavioral problems.124   
It is from within this morass that victims ask their attorneys to advocate or 
not advocate on their behalf.  When the victim is faced with so many potential 
negative consequences, it is no wonder that victims ask their attorneys to help them 
avoid state intervention even when their safety is at risk.  The lawyer is then left to 
question whether she should engage in the requested advocacy (or non-advocacy) 
and if it is ethically or morally responsible to do so.  We turn to the issues of capacity 
and competence and the rules of professional responsibility for guidance about the 
extent to which an attorney is bound by a victim-client’s decision.   
 
COMPETENCE, CAPACITY, AND THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY  
There are many reasons why a victim would choose not to involve the 
criminal justice system when an act of domestic violence has been committed or a 
121 Hagan & Dinovitzer, supra note 120, at 124, 139. 
122 Id. at 124-125. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 122, 138. 
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restraining order or protective order has been violated. For many victims, the 
decision not to leave an abuser or request state intervention is calculated and largely 
rational.  The victim considers competing concerns and decides whether the factors 
weighing in favor of acting outweigh those supporting inaction. The weighted factors 
differ by victim, and the calculation for each individual is personal. In our case study, 
as in many, Sarah’s decisions were well reasoned and resulted from a complex 
balancing of pros and cons.  Nonetheless, some question a victim’s “competence” or 
“capacity” to make decisions when those decisions involve exposure to harm. 
There has been little discussion of the “competence” and “capacity” of 
domestic violence victims to make autonomous, rational decisions and have the 
agency to realize those decisions.125  For some, that a victim would “choose” to stay 
with a perpetrator indicates clouded judgment.  Society treats a victim’s decision as 
to whether to leave an abusive relationship as evidence of her competence.126  
Sometimes the question of whether a victim is competent is framed in terms of legal 
competence, meaning a legal standard relating to a person’s mental ability to 
understand problems and make decisions.127  Some argue that victims may not be 
125 See Margaret E. Johnson, Balancing Liberty, Dignity, and Safety: The Impact of 
Domestic Violence Lethality Screening, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 545 (2010); Ruth 
Jones, Guardianship for Coercively Controlled Battered Women: Breaking the 
Control of the Abuser, 88 GEO. L.J. 605, 609-611 (2000); Goodmark, supra note 42, 
at 22-29; Erin L. Han, Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop Policies: Victim 
Empowerment in Domestic Violence Cases, 23 B. C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 159, 166-
167 (2003); Prentice L. White, Stopping the Chronic Batterer Through Legislation: 
Will it Work This Time? 31 PEPP. L. REV. 709, 728 (2004); Dana Harrington Conner, 
To Protect or to Serve: Confidentiality, Client Protection, and Domestic Violence, 
79 TEMP. L. REV. 877, 926 (2006).    
126 Mahoney, supra note 96, at 78. 
127 Connie J. A. Beck & Lynda E. Frost, Defining a Threshold for Client Competence 
to Participate in Divorce Mediation, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1. 4 (2006); 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 322 (9th ed. 2009).  We discuss competence under the 
Professional Rules of Model Conduct later in this paper. 
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competent to make decisions consistent with their values and priorities if they are 
too afraid of their abusers.128  Others claim that domestic violence victims make 
inauthentic choices due to duress, arguing that victim decision-making is controlled 
by fear of the abuser and desire to avoid retaliation.129  Because of this duress, the 
victim is not able to make decisions serving her own best interests.130 
Some commentators have argued that domestic violence victims do not 
have the “capacity” to make decisions with legal consequences.  While “capacity” 
and “competence” are similar and often are used interchangeably,131  they are distinct 
concepts.  Competency generally refers to a legal standard that is required to 
complete a legal task.132  To be competent, an individual’s capacities or functional 
abilities must be sufficient for the context in which a decision is being made.133  
Capacity, on the other hand, speaks to an individual’s level of psychological 
functioning.134  Psychological or psychiatric evaluations can determine an 
128 Beck & Frost, supra note 127, at 28. 
129 Susan S.M. Edwards, From Victim to Defendant: The Life Sentence of British 
Women, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 261, 284 (1994).   
130 Id.   
131 The definition for capacity cross-references the definition for competence in the 
Black’s Law Dictionary (“[s]ee competency”) BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 235 (9th 
ed. 2009); Beck & Frost, supra note 127, at 4; Paul S. Appelbaum, Assessment of 
Patients’ Competence to Consent to Treatment, 357 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1834 (Nov. 
2007). 
132 Beck & Frost, supra note 127, at 4; HUGH M. LEE & JO ALISON TAYLOR, 
ALABAMA ELDER LAW § 1:7, Ethical considerations—Assessing client competence 
(Nov. 2012).  
133 Beck & Frost, supra note 127, at 4; See 62 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 197 
(2001) (citing McKinney's Public Health Law § 2981, subd. 1(b)); Matter of Rose 
S., 293 A.D.2d 619, 741 N.Y.S.2d 84 (2d Dep't 2002); See also Wheeler v. United 
States, 159 U.S. 523, 524-25 (1895) (discussing competence of children).   
134 Beck & Frost, supra note 127, at 4; See also Erica Wood, Addressing Capacity: 
What Is the Role of the Mediator?, MEDIATE.COM (July 2003), 
http://www.mediate.com/articles/woodE1.cfm;  THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING 
COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND INSTRUMENTS 2 (2d ed. 2003). 
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individual’s capacity to make rational decisions, understand complex concepts, or 
understand the nature and effect of one’s acts.135  
The Comment to Rule 1.2 notes that Rule 1.14 controls “[i]n a case in which 
the client appears to be suffering diminished capacity….”136  Rule 1.14137 considers 
this messy notion of “diminished capacity.”  Rule 1.14(a) states that capacity may be 
diminished “because of minority, mental impairment or for some other reason.”138  
This definition is very broad and could arguably extend to some victims, especially 
given the catchall phrase “for some other reason.”   
In a case of diminished capacity, the lawyer may take reasonable action to 
protect the client.  Rule 1.14(b) provides that “[w]hen the lawyer reasonably believes 
that the client has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or 
other harm unless action is take and cannot adequately act in the client’s own interest, 
the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting 
with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client 
and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, 
conservator or guardian.”139 
Professor Ruth Jones asserts that some domestic violence victims should be 
appointed legal guardians due to capacity issues.140  For Jones, some domestic 
violence victims are “unable to act on their own” and “require an intervention that 
permits someone else to act on their behalf to protect them from their abusers until 
135LEE & TAYLOR, supra note 132; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 235 (9th ed. 2009). 
136 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2003). 
137 Id. at 1.14. 
138 Id. at 1.14(a). 
139 Id. at 1.14(b). 
140 Jones, supra note 126, at 609. 
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they can protect themselves.”141  She argues that guardianship of a victim may be 
necessary when the abuse has deprived the victim of the ability to exercise 
independent judgment.142  This guardianship would remain in effect until the 
abuser’s control of the victim is removed and a victim can make decisions for 
herself.143  The guardian could obtain public benefits and obtain and enforce a 
restraining order on the victim’s behalf.144  The guardian could also restrict the 
victim’s contact with the abuser and forcibly remove the abuser from the shared 
residence or move the victim into separate housing.145  The desired outcome of the 
“aggressive intervention” of a guardianship is for the victim to decide to end the 
abusive relationship.146   
The Court of Appeals of Minnesota addressed the capacity of a domestic 
violence victim in a conservatorship case, where the victim refused to seek a 
restraining order.  In In Re Conservatorship of Barbara J. Frarck, a Minnesota 
appellate court upheld the lower court’s decision to appoint a conservator for a 
domestic violence victim.147  Barbara Frarck was in an abusive relationship and 
suffered from borderline personality disorder.148  The court wrote that “[d]espite 
being physically abused by [her boyfriend], Frarck remains involved in their 
relationship” and that the testimony “indicated that if a conservator were appointed 
and sought a restraining order, Frarck could be protected from his abuse.”  While the 
141 Id. at 628. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 610, 656. 
144 Id. at 642. 
145 Id. at 655. 
146 Id. at 642. 
147 In re Conservatorship of Frarck, No. C4-92-2176, 1993 WL 139537 (Minn. Ct. 
App. May 4, 1993); See Jones, supra note 125, at 641-642. 
148 In re Conservatorship of Frarck, supra note 147, at *1. 
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court appointed a conservator based on both the domestic violence and Frarck’s 
mental condition, the court focused more on the domestic violence in concluding that 
a conservatorship was appropriate. The court stated that, “Frarck’s continued threats 
to move in with her boyfriend, despite his abusive treatment, indicate that she is 
unable to make rational decisions about her living arrangements.”149  The court went 
on to state, “Without a conservator, there is no legal mechanism to stop the abuse, 
given Frarck’s refusal to obtain a protective order.”150   
This focus on exiting the relationship as the test of competence and 
agency151 is highly problematic.  A victim’s physical acts of remaining with an 
abuser or seeking separation cannot be the test as to whether a victim is acting in her 
own best interests.152 Victims are competent, rational decision-makers, but the nature 
of the relationship limits their choices.  Their options are narrowed by the conditions 
of the abusive relationship and possible consequences for violating the confines of 
the relationship as established by the abuser.   
The Model Rules of Professional Responsibility are not particularly helpful 
in determining when an attorney must take direction from the client.  Rule 1.2 
requires that “[a] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives 
of representation,”153 but the lawyer “may limit the scope of the representation if the 
limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed 
consent.”154  Under Rule 1.2(d), “A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at *2. 
151 Mahoney, supra note 96, at 73-81 (introducing the concept of exit as the test of 
the level of agency for domestic violence victims). 
152 Id. at 74. 
153 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a). 
154 Id. at 1.2(c).   
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assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer 
may …counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, 
scope, meaning or application of the law.”155  A lawyer cannot, for example, advise 
a client to disregard a ruling of the court.156   
Rule 1.16, Declining or Terminating Representation provides that “a lawyer 
shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw 
from the representation of a client if … the representation will result in a violation 
of the rules of professional conduct or other law;”157 and “[a] lawyer may withdraw 
from representing a client if: withdrawal can be accomplished without material 
adverse effect on the interests of the client”158 or if “the client persists in a course of 
conduct involving the lawyer’s services that the lawyer reasonably believes is 
criminal or fraudulent; [t]he client has used the lawyer’s services to perpetrate a 
crime or fraud; [t]he client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers 
repugnant or imprudent or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement; 
[o]r other good cause for withdrawal exists.”159 
For the purposes of this paper, we are assuming that a lawyer who does not 
wish to continue to represent a client who refuses to enforce a restraining order can 
seek to withdraw pursuant to Rule 1.16(b)(3) if the lawyer considers this decision to 
be repugnant or imprudent or fundamentally disagrees with the refusal.  It may be 
that the court will not allow withdrawal.  That situation is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  Rule 1.16 raises more salient questions: what is “a violation of the rules of 
155 Id. at 1.2(d). 
156 Matter of Johnson, 597 P.2d 740, 743 (Mont. 1979). 
157 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1). 
158 Id. at 1.16(b)(1). 
159 Id. at 1.16(b)(2)-(4),(7). 
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professional conduct or other law?”160  What is “a course of conduct involving the 
lawyer’s services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent?”161 
What does it mean that the lawyer’s services are used to “perpetuate a crime or 
fraud?”162 Is the lawyer obligated to inform the court of the abuser’s violation of 
restraining and protective orders? In Sarah’s case, we told Sarah that the violations 
would likely arise and that she would have to testify truthfully, but we did not take 
affirmative steps to advise the court of the violations. Had we done so, Sarah’s 
husband would likely have been incarcerated. Sarah would have been safer, at the 
expense of our ignoring our client’s directions.  
One scholar has suggested that in some situations domestic violence 
lawyers should break client confidentiality and request outside intervention from law 
enforcement or others when the lawyer assesses that a victim is at risk of harm.163  
For support, she cites Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(b)(1), which 
provides that “[a] lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a 
client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary…to prevent reasonably 
certain death of substantial bodily harm.”164  We have never contemplated going this 
far outside of the bounds of the attorney-client relationship.  For one, we do not 
believe that an attorney is in a position to conduct risk assessments or make such 
determinations based on “the facts and circumstances of the case” and the “intuition 
of the lawyer.”165 That conclusion, however, says little more than reaffirming our 
160 Id. at 1.16(a)(1). 
161 Id. at 1.16(b)(2). 
162 Id. at 1.16(b)(3). 
163 Harrington Conner, supra note 125. 
164 Id. at 900-911 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2003)). 
165 Id. at 937. 
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commitment to confidentiality. It does not answer the thornier question of the 
lawyer’s responsibility to the client’s direction, the client’s safety, and the court. 
There are different views on how lawyers approach clients and issues. We 
believed, and continue to believe, in “client-centered lawyering.” We might have 
treated this issue differently if we were “cause lawyers.” It may be helpful to consider 
what it means to be a client-centered lawyer or a cause lawyer in the context of a 
domestic violence case. 
 
DIFFERENT LAWYERING MODELS 
A. Client-Centered Lawyering 
 
Starting in the late 1970s, lawyers and law school clinics started to move 
from a traditional lawyer-client relationship to an alternative “client-centered 
model,”166 encouraging students to develop meaningful relationships167 with their 
clients and depart from a traditionally paternalistic and adversarial approach to 
litigation.168  Over time, client-centered lawyering has increasingly focused on 
166 Laurie Shanks, Whose Story is it, Anyway? – Guiding Students to Client-Centered 
Interviewing Through Storytelling, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 509 (2008); Katherine R. 
Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-Centered Representation, 
12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369, 369 (2006). 
167 One foundation of a meaningful lawyer-client relationship that should be taught 
to students is empathy for the client’s dilemma.  See Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. 
Weinstein, When Students Lose Perspective: Clinical Supervision and the 
Management of Empathy, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 135 (2002). 
168 See GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS 
FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY (1978); DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. 
PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 
(1977); see also DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-
CENTERED APPROACH (1991).   
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treating the client holistically, emphasizing problem-solving, and not just the client’s 
immediate case.”169 
Client-centered lawyering has four primary components: 
(1) it draws attention to the critical importance of non-legal aspects of a 
client’s situation; (2) it places the lawyer’s role in the representation within 
limitations set by a sharply circumscribed view of the lawyer’s professional 
expertise; (3) it insists on the primacy of client decision-making; and (4) it 
places a high value on the lawyers’ understanding their clients’ 
perspectives, emotions and values.170 
 
Client-centered lawyering seeks to place the client in control of the 
attorney-client relationship and decision-making.  Client-centered lawyering is a 
model that “puts the attorney in the role of an open, accepting helper and leaves both 
priority-setting and decision-making to the client.  The lawyer helps the client 
determine what is best for him in light of his own priorities.”171  In client-centered 
counseling, “the emphasis is on achieving the greatest client satisfaction.”172   
This model represents a diversion from the traditional paternalistic, 
attorney-knows-best role that many attorneys adopt, where the decision-making is 
based upon the attorney’s knowledge, priorities, and beliefs, rather than the client’s 
interests.173  Client-centered lawyering advocates suggest that the adversarial legal 
system encourages attorneys to make choices on behalf of their clients that are 
strategically wise, while failing to recognize the client’s interest in participating in 
decision-making. Advocates believe the traditional approach is a product of the 
169 Jason K. Cohen, Know Your Client: Maximizing Advocacy by Incorporating 
Client-Centered Principles into Legal Writing Rhetoric Practice, 1 CHARLOTTE L. 
REV. 253, 263 (2009) (citing Alex J. Hurder, The Lawyer’s Dilemma: To Be or Not 
to Be a Problem-Solving Negotiator, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 253, 286 (2007)). 
170 Kruse, supra note 166, at 377. 
171 Robert M. Bastress, Client Centered Counseling and Moral Accountability for 
Lawyers, 10 J. LEGAL PROF. 97, 98 (1985) (emphasis added). 
172 Cohen, supra note 169, at 262. 
173 Bastress, supra note 171, at 97. 
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adversarial legal system and the approach toward lawyering that was taught in law 
school. In contrast, in a client-centered lawyering relationship, “[t]he client does not 
perceive himself as, and is not, an instrument to be manipulated by the lawyer.”174  
A client of a client-centered lawyer “directs his own destiny, relying on the lawyer 
as a helper and as a guide through the legal labyrinths.”175  This model “emphasizes 
autonomy and individual growth” for the client.176 
Under the client-centered model, mutual trust between the parties will 
empower the client to assume the dominant role of decision-maker, and the attorney 
can adopt a more passive role as the client’s counselor.177  The responsibility and 
ability to develop mutual trust between the lawyer and client rests entirely on the 
attorney, who is traditionally seen as being in control of the relationship.  The lawyer 
should place himself or herself in the client’s position, attempting to understand the 
client’s situation and emotions.178  
A client-centered lawyer helps the client select the best course of action, 
rather than merely outlining the options and instructing the client to pick the path of 
his choice.  Many scholars writing about client-centered lawyering use the term 
“holistic” to describe the lawyer’s role within this model.179  The lawyer remains 
neutral and serves as a resource to the client during his decision-making process.180 
174 Id. at 100. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Much scholarship on this issue refers to the client-centered lawyering model as 
“client-centered counseling.”  See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 170; Robert D. 
Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 501 (1990). 
178 Bastress, supra note 171, at 101. 
179 Kruse, supra note 166, at 372. 
180 Deborah J. Cantrell, What’s Love Got to Do with It?: Contemporary Lessons on 
Lawyerly Advocacy from the Preacher Martin Luther King, Jr., 22 ST. THOMAS L. 
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While this model is intended to allow the client to make all decisions 
autonomously, involving the lawyer only when necessary, some scholars believe this 
cannot work in practice.181  One critic argues that the differences between the client-
centered and traditional models are nonexistent when applied to everyday lawyering: 
The client-centered literature fails to present even a single example in which 
a lawyer sits down with a client and walks through alternative case theories 
and their implications for the case and client.  In this respect, the client-
centered approach differs little from the traditional approach, which 
relegates virtually every decision about case theory to lawyers.182  
 
Other critics argue that clients are not in the best position to make legal decisions.  
Instead, when a client hires you, they demonstrate “tacit willingness for you to make 
lawyering skills decisions free from consultation” with them.183   
The difficulty is in the execution. Professor Jane Stoever writes about 
teaching her students to be “client-centered and client-empowering advocates who 
provide representation that enhances both a survivors’ safety and autonomy.”184 
Implicit in client-centered lawyering is that the client may reach a different decision 
than the lawyer.  Having fostered that autonomy, what do we do when autonomy and 
safety diverge? Professors Susan Bryant and Maria Arias also discuss empowering 
their clinic’s domestic violence clients as part of the clinic’s design.185 Professors 
REV. 296, 304 (2010) (ensuring that the client “retains her autonomy and freedom of 
thought,” and “the lawyer truly remains the agent of the client/principal”). 
181 Alex J. Hurder, Negotiating the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Search for 
Equality and Collaboration, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 71, 76 (1996). 
182 Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case 
Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485, 511-512 (1994). 
183 BINDER ET AL., supra note 168, at 270. 
184 Jane K. Stoever, Transforming Domestic Violence Representation, 101 KY. L.J. 
483, 488 (2013). 
185 Susan Bryant & Maria Arias, Case Study A Battered Women’s Rights Clinic: 
Designing a Clinical Program Which Encourages a Problem-Solving Vision of 
Lawyering that Empowers Clients and Community, 42 WASH. U.J. URB. & 
CONTEMP. L. 207 (1992). 
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Bryant and Arias note that a client-centered approach “allows the students to see 
patterns of oppression and…recognize the uniqueness of each client’s situation.”186 
They discuss a case in which the students determined that the client wanted to file 
court papers seeking custody and a restraining order, which the students prepared, 
but the client missed her appointment to sign the papers. The students later learned 
through a social worker that the client, while afraid of her husband, was not ready to 
pursue a legal remedy.187 Professors Bryant and Arias note that the clinic’s client 
empowerment “allows the client to participate in defining what a lawyer’s role 
should be,”188 and that in such a relationship, the lawyer’s role “changes with each 
client because the lawyer alone does not set the professional boundaries.”189  
Professor Michelle Jacobs endorses client-based lawyering as a good model 
for students, but states that a major weakness is the failure to address race, class, and 
(to a lesser extent) gender in the attorney/client relationship.190 Professor Jacobs 
argues that the purpose of client-centered lawyering as a model is to “return the client 
to the centrality of the lawyer’s work,” but that clients, particularly clients of color 
(and women?) are still at the margins of the relationship.191 She reminds us that 
everyone – including lawyers, law students, and law professors – have preconceived 
notions rooted in our cultural background.192 
In the domestic violence arena, our preconceived notions often center on 
our difficulty in accepting that a victim of domestic violence remains with her abuser. 
186 Id. at 217. 
187 Id. at 219-20. 
188 Id. at 220. 
189 Id.  
190 Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in Client-
Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 345, 346 (1997). 
191 Id. at 348. 
192 Id. at 377.  
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A great deal of the literature on domestic violence tries to answer the question, “Why 
do abused women stay?” As lawyers, we translate that question to “What can we do 
to help our client leave?” As Professor Jacobs points out, only when we see the 
client’s reality can we truly work with the client in a collaborative way.193   
 Putting aside our preconceived notions does not answer our question of 
limits, i.e. is there a point at which we cannot assist the client in relation to the court 
or her own risky behavior, it does move us further down the road. In our case study, 
this was the single most important factor in acting as we did. 
B. Cause Lawyering  
As Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold have noted, “providing a single, 
cross culturally valid definition of the concept [of cause lawyering] is impossible.”194 
Writing on the intersections of race, space, and poverty, Tom Calmore writes that 
“cause lawyering encompasses various law-related activities, from rights assertion 
to legal counseling, that relies on law-related means to achieve social justice for 
individuals and subordinated or disadvantaged groups.”195 Stuart Scheingold 
describes “Left-Activist Lawyering in Seattle,”196 Richard Abel writes that “the 
moments when law offers leverage to the relatively powerless as well as those when 
193 Id. at 404. 
194 Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of 
Professional Authority, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, 5 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold  ed., 1998). 
195 John O. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause 
Lawyering at the Intersection of Race, Space, and Poverty, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1927 (1999) (citing Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering: 
Toward an Understanding of the Motivation and Commitment of Social Justice 
Lawyers, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES 31, 37 (1998)). 
196 Stuart Scheingold, The Struggle to Politicize Legal Practice: A Case Study of 
Left-Activist Lawyering in Seattle, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS 
AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, 118 (1998). 
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it is wielded, or trumped, by power” are “occasions for cause lawyering,”197 and 
Thomas Hilbink, reviewing Sarat and Scheingold, comments on the definitional 
difficulty, noting that “belief in a cause and a desire to advance that cause are the 
forces that drive cause lawyering actions” for cause lawyers, but “[h]ow does one 
determine what fits within the rubric?”198 Ann Southworth, one of the few scholars 
who has examined the right’s response to the historic left-leaning cause lawyering, 
shows that the “cause” in cause lawyering can be broad indeed, and virtually every 
progressive cause lawyer now has a conservative counterpart.199  Today, for every 
cause, we can be confident that there are cause lawyers on every side of the issue. 
Cause lawyering in the field of domestic violence can take a variety of 
approaches. Karen Czapanskiy notes that “women lawyers and law professors were 
the first to construct the issue as a legal problem,” partly as a consequence of the 
identification of the battering of women as an issue affecting women’s liberation. 
Feminist women lawyers were instrumental in developing the theory and legal 
regime addressing domestic violence issues.200 These efforts took a variety of forms, 
including criminal defense,201 family law in both legal services offices202 and private 
practice,203 state and federal legislative efforts to establish governmental intervention 
197 Richard Abel, Speaking Law to Power: Occasions for Cause Lawyering, in 
CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES, 69 (1998). 
198 Thomas M. Hilbink, You Know the Type: Categories of Cause Lawyering, 29 
LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 657, 659 (2004). 
199 ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING THE 
CONSERVATIVE COALITION (2008). 
200 Karen Czapanskiy, Domestic Violence, the Family, and the Lawyering Process: 
Lessons From Studies on Gender Bias in the Courts, 27 FAM. L.Q. 247, 258-259 
(1993). 
201 See, e.g., Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and 
Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379 (1991). 
202 Czapanskiy, supra note 201, at 258-259. 
203 Id. 
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on behalf of domestic violence victims, a remarkably successful effort resulting in 
restraining order statutes and other protections in every state,204 as well as the 
passage of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) in 1994 and reauthorizations 
in 2000, 2005, and 2013.205  
Still, even without reaching the push-back by “men’s rights” organizations 
against domestic violence protections,206 today’s domestic violence lawyers may 
agree on the cause, but not necessarily the approach. Twenty years after Professor 
Czapanskiy’s article, feminist attorneys still play a major role in representing 
individual clients in domestic violence cases, but the advocacy community is split 
into those who support and those who oppose mandatory arrest.  
 Mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecutions have placed prosecutors in a 
more prominent role. As Deborah Epstein has noted, activists have focused on 
“transforming the responses of police, prosecutors, and the courts.”207 Legal reforms 
include warrantless arrest, mandatory arrest, no-drop prosecutions, and temporary 
orders with substantial implications and few procedural protections.208  
Donna Wills, a veteran family violence prosecutor in Los Angeles, has 
written that she “firmly believe[s]” that an aggressive no-drop and no-dismissal 
204 See, e.g., Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. 13701; Victims of Trafficking 
and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464.  For state 
resources, see generally, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, 
www.ncsc.org/Topics/Children-Families-and-Elders/Domestic-Violence/Resource-
Guide.aspx. 
205 42 U.S.C. § 13701 (1996, as amended through 2014); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266 
(2000). 
206 See, e.g., THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR MEN, www.nationalcenterformen.org, (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2014). 
207 Epstein, supra note 30, at 1845. 
208 Id. at 1847-1848. 
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policy “is the enlightened approach to domestic violence prosecutions.”209 Wills 
approaches domestic violence through a cause lawyer’s lens, stating that it is a 
societal problem, not just an individual or private problem, with a strong State 
interest in maintaining public safety. In focusing on the State interest, Wills expands 
the protective umbrella to include children as secondary victims.210 To Wills (and 
other supporters of mandatory arrest and no-drop policies), these policies prevent 
batterers from controlling the justice system through their victims.211  Under this 
approach, the domestic violence victim is best protected by having no power, with 
decision-making resting with the State, in the form of the police and prosecutor.  
As Wills admits, there is no evidence that mandatory arrest and no-drop 
policies reduce the incidence of domestic violence.212 Betsy Tsai, a Domestic 
Violence Resource Coordinator for the New York City Courts, notes that criminal 
justice system employees are “frustrated and embarrassed by their inability to protect 
victims of domestic violence,” and suggests that the court system should look toward 
specialized domestic violence courts.213 The specialized courts incorporate 
therapeutic jurisprudence, a multidisciplinary effort to provide comprehensive 
services.214 Therapeutic jurisprudence is a reaction to the inevitable mental health 
and psychological functioning of the participants in the legal system.215 In practice, 
a therapeutic approach would include a supportive and informative environment to 
209 Donna Wills, Domestic Violence: The Case for Aggressive Prosecution, 7 UCLA 
WOMEN’S L. J. 173, 173 (1997).  
210 Id. at 175. 
211 Id. at 180. 
212 Id. 
213 Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: 
Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1285, 1287 (2000). 
214 Id. at 1294-1295. 
215 Id. 
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the victim, victim and witness advocates, police training, more careful monitoring of 
defendant compliance with court orders, and participation in intervention programs 
for abusers.216 This does not mean that the victim regains control of the decisions 
that so dramatically affect her life. In many jurisdictions employing a therapeutic 
jurisprudence system, the State, not the victim, controls the case.217 
 
WHEN PRIVATE RIGHTS BECOME PUBLIC AND COURTS INTERVENE 
In the Mary Adkins/Elizabeth Tullis g-chat, Elizabeth Tullis says that “once 
you enter the criminal law system, it’s not just the interest of the victim, but of society 
that is at issue. Going into the system, you marshal the resources of the state to protect 
you, but you also cede some control of the case to the State.” Mary and Elizabeth 
raise the question of whether private rights become public once a victim seeks state 
intervention. Does society have an independent interest in enforcing the restraining 
order? 
Courts have allowed the public interest to transcend private choices, 
including forced feeding in prisons,218 and forced medical care to children, even in 
the face of religious opposition by the child’s parents.219  The commonality in these 
cases is the likelihood of harm, and the public interest in preventing that harm. The 
question, when it comes to domestic violence cases, is the extent to which we are 
comfortable predicting future violence, and whether or not our conclusions should 
affect our representation of clients who are at risk. In the area of domestic violence, 
216 Id. at 1298-1300. 
217 Id. at 1306. 
218 Com., Dept. of Public Welfare, Fairview State Hosp. v. Kallinger, 580 A.2d  887 
( Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990). 
219 See, e.g., Matter of McCauley, 565 N.E.2d 411 (Mass. 1991); State v. Perricone, 
37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962). 
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the rationale behind mandatory arrest policies and forced testimony combines the 
notions of many of the themes of this paper, including a patronizing view of 
protecting the victim from her inability to protect herself, a reformist attitude of 
treating all cases uniformly, and the criminalization of domestic violence and the 
transfer of decision-making to the State. The question is whether State involvement, 
either through civil or criminal process, turns a private domestic violence matter into 
a public issue.     
As we discussed earlier, several courts have sanctioned women or forced 
them to testify when the women refused to cooperate with the State in pursuing 
domestic violence remedies or testifying in criminal matters. Implicit in these 
decisions is a belief that the right to withdraw from civil or criminal prosecution has 
been supplanted by State interests. To get a sense of judicial reasoning in these cases, 
it helps to look at death penalty cases, where the issue of public rights trumping the 
private attorney-client relationship has arisen prominently.  
In 1987, a Connecticut court sentenced Michael Ross to death, after he 
confessed to murdering eight women.220  He fought execution for 17 years, but 
ultimately withdrew all appeals and requested that the execution go forward,221 
starting a new proceeding questioning whether a defendant can rationally and 
competently choose to die, and whether the public has a right to contest an execution.  
The Chief Public Defender’s office sought to intervene in Ross’s case, arguing that 
Ross was trying to commit “judicial, state-assisted suicide,” an argument based on 
Ross’s alleged incompetence to make the decision to consent to the execution.222  
220 State v. Ross, 849 A.2d 648, 665 (Conn. 2004). 
221 Id. 
222 Application to Justice Ginsberg to Vacate Stay of Execution of Michael Ross, 
Lantz v. Ross, 543 U.S. 1134 (2005) No. 04A656, available at 
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Ross’s former lawyer, the Office of the Public Defender, argued that Ross’s 
execution would make executions “more socially and politically” acceptable, an 
issue of great importance to the Public Defender’s other clients facing execution.223   
The Public Defender’s prediction was almost certainly correct, but this is 
not how attorneys usually act.  Rule 1.9(1) of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility224 explicitly prohibited the Public Defender from representing an 
interest adverse to Ross, and Rule 1.9(2) explicitly prohibited using information 
obtained during representation against Ross’s interests.225  How, then, could the 
Public Defender use its knowledge of Ross’s mental condition as the basis for legal 
actions that, in the words of Ross’s subsequent attorney, T.R. Paulding, “are contrary 
to the defendant’s wishes or desires”?226  The answer—and this is not much of an 
answer—is that some issues raise public as well as private rights. 
Ross understood the incongruous nature of the proceedings, stating on his 
web site that “I fully support their position and efforts to bring about the abolition of 
capital punishment in this State…But I do have a problem when they interfere with 
my personal decisions…to resolve this case in a manner that I believe will harm the 
least number of people…These are decisions that I and I alone must make.”227  Ross 
objected to the actions of the Public Defender, stating “what I’m hoping is that 
http://www.ct.gov/csao/lib/csao/app_to_vacate_stay_of_execution_04a656.pdf; 
Rebecca Leung, A Decision to Die, CBS NEWS 60 MINUTES (Jan. 26, 2005) 
(reporting on Charlie Rose broadcast of January 26, 2005), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500164_162-669530.html. 
223 Lynne Tuohy, Defenders Ordered Out of Ross Case, COURANT (Dec. 16, 2004), 
http://articles.courant.com/2004-12-16/news/0412160987_1_defenders-clifford-
second-penalty-hearing. 
224 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9(1) (2003). 
225 Id. at 1.9(2). 
226 Tuohy, supra note 223. 
227 Michael P. Ross, Why I Choose Death Rather than to Fight for Life, MONSTER? 
YOU DECIDE, http://www.wild-side.com/ross.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
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January 26, I will be executed. I just don’t understand why the public defenders can’t 
understand that. I mean, it’s so simple. And it’s my damned decision.”228 
Ross’s sister and father each filed separate next-friend actions, his sister 
arguing that Ross was not mentally competent to waive his rights, and his father 
arguing that his rights were being violated because he could not “volunteer” to be 
executed.229  The case was assigned to U.S. District Judge Robert Chatigny, who 
raised concerns about the competency claims.230  Paulding argued that Ross 
understood the appeals process, was knowledgeable about death penalty law, and 
was choosing to forego appeals.231 He stated that Ross “had made a logical, rational 
decision. He needed a voice in our court system…I think I’m an attorney before I’m 
a defense attorney…I think your duty, your basic duty as an attorney, is to represent 
your client.”232 
Judge Chatigny tried to persuade Paulding to pursue an appeal despite 
Ross’s expressed wishes of his client,233 telling him, “what you are doing is terribly, 
terribly wrong. No matter how well motivated you are, you have a client whose 
competence is in serious doubt and you don’t know what you are talking about,”234  
that failure to pursue an appeal was malpractice,235 and threatening to go after 
Paulding’s license to practice law if future evidence showed that Ross was not 
228 Leung, supra note 222. 
229 Ross v. Rell, No. 3:05-CV-130 (PCD) (D. Conn. 2005) (Temporary restraining 





232 Leung, supra note 222. 
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competent.236  Paulding got the message, and filed motions for another competency 
hearing in state court.  The state court held that Ross was mentally competent to 
waive future appeals and proceed to his execution.237 He was executed on May 13, 
2005.238 
In 1996, the New Jersey Supreme Court, considering a similar question, 
explicitly transformed the defendant’s rights into a public question, holding that 
appeals of a death sentence were mandatory and could not be waived,239 stating that 
the public interest “transcends the preferences of individual defendants.”240 Like 
Ross, John Martini requested that his execution proceed as scheduled and that his 
public defender not pursue post-conviction relief. In proceeding with a post-
conviction review, the Court noted that: 
It is difficult to explain why a murderer who has admitted his guilt and had 
his conviction and sentence of death affirmed on direct appeal should not 
be granted his request to be executed immediately. For some, no 
explanation may be necessary. For others, no explanation will suffice. For 
those who wish to understand, we explain that under our form of 
government it is not the inmate on death row or the accused who determines 
when and whether the State shall execute a prisoner; rather, the law itself 
makes that determination. The public has an interest in the reliability and 
integrity of a death sentencing decision that transcends the preferences of 
individual defendants. 241 
 
The Court recognized that its view was not universal: 
 
We acknowledge that other jurisdictions do not recognize the standing of 
one such as the Public Defender to prosecute a post-conviction relief 
236 Id. 
237 State of Connecticut v. Michael Ross, Memorandum of Decision, No. CR84-
20300, 20355, 20356 (Conn. Super. Ct., April 22, 2005), available at 
http://www.ct.gov/csao/cwp/view.asp?A=1801&Q=292090. 
238 William Yardley & Stacey Stowe, Connecticut Carries Out Its First Execution in 
45 Years, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2005, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/13/nyregion/13cnd-death.html?pagewanted=all. 
239 State v. Martini, 677 A.2d 1106 (N.J. 1996), overruled by State v. Reddish, 859 
A.2d 1173 (2004). 
240 Id. at 1112. 
241 Id. 
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application on behalf of a death row inmate who does not seek their 
assistance. It is a natural reaction for some to wish to be rid of an admitted 
murderer who asks to be executed. The Court is nonetheless required to 
ensure the integrity of death sentences in New Jersey.242 
 
 Martini changed his mind, and requested that his Public Defender pursue 
any available remedies.243 He was subsequently convicted of three additional 
murders in Pennsylvania and Arizona.244 On July 26, 2006, The New Jersey Supreme 
Court upheld Martini’s death sentence, but New Jersey had imposed a moratorium 
on the death penalty six months earlier.245 Martini died in prison in 2009.246 
Does the “public right” principle apply to domestic violence cases? As 
Elizabeth Tullis noted, when a victim obtains a restraining order, not to mention a 
protective order, she cedes some authority to the State. Do we, as lawyers, cede a 
part of our relationship with our clients? 
We are trained as lawyers to separate ourselves from the consequences to 
third parties of our representation.  Criminal defense attorneys accept that they are 
representing the accused, not the victim, society, or the hypothetical future victim.  
Attorneys representing a parent in a dependency and neglect case take direction from 
the parent, regardless of qualms about the child’s future care.  In domestic violence 
242 Id. 
243 Maria Newman, Death Row Inmate Instructs Lawyers to Fight for His Life, N.Y. 
TIMES, August 17, 1999, available at 
www.nytimes.com/1999/08/17/nyregion/death-row-inmate-instructs-lawyers-to-
fight-for-his-life.html?ref=johnmartini. 
244 Barbara Boyer, A defiant Murdurer Dies at 79: John Martini, condemned to death 
in 1990 for killing a Fair Lawn man, died in his jail cell. He killed at least three 
others, PHILLY.COM, Sept. 11, 2009, http://articles.philly.com/2009-09-
11/news/25268088_1_death-penalty-irving-flax-favor-of-capital-punishment. 
245 The Associated Press, Newark: Court Upholds Death Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, July 
26, 2006,                                        
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/26/nyregion/26mbrfs-008.html?ref=johnmartini; 
Boyer, supra note 244. 
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cases, we accept that there are valid reasons why women do not leave the abuser, and 
that additional abuse may, and often does, occur during the representation.  There is 
a different quality to a case in which a client is using the lawyer’s legal services to 
avoid a court order meant to protect her.  Is there a point at which this becomes a 
public right, enforceable by the state?   
While it is rare, victims, having obtained restraining orders, have been 
charged with violating those orders, while some courts have struck down the charges 
against the victim as a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.247  The analogy to death cases may be useful on a lethality scale, but 
falters when considering the competing interests of the victim. When law 
enforcement intervenes and penalizes the victim for violating a restraining order 
against her abuser, the focus of the legal system shifts from the abuser to the victim 
and “the abuser is not held fully accountable.”248  The victim is prosecuted for 
inviting her abuser back into her life—often for a legitimate purpose, such as to 
discuss childcare or request financial assistance.249   
When a civil restraining order can be enforced against either party, the 
purposes of the restraining order system are undermined.  Victims will be less likely 
to report abuse for fear any action on theirs will be used against them; abusers could 
use the restraining orders as continued ploys against their battered victims; and the 
blame for the abuse shifts from the batterer to the battered.  
247 N. Olmsted v. Bullington, 744 N.E.2d 1225, 1228 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); See also 
Bays v. Bays, 779 So.2d 754, 758 (La. 2001). 
248 CAROLYN HAM, INJUSTICE DEFINED: WHY BATTERED WOMEN CANNOT AND 
SHOULD NOT BE CHARGED WITH VIOLATING CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS THAT 
WERE ISSUED AT THEIR REQUEST, BATTERED WOMEN’S PROJECT 6 (October 2003). 
249 Id. at 5. 
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In the abstract, the public enforcement of restraining orders, like mandatory 
arrest policies, has advantages. However, in the context of domestic violence, the 
public’s interest in the victim’s well-being is not so black and white.  The 
enforcement of the restraining order may serve the public good of protecting the 
victim, but if the means necessary for that enforcement further victimizes the battered 
woman and provides a disincentive for victims to report abuse at all, then we need 
to question whether the benefit of enhanced enforcement outweighs the inherent 
value of client-based decision-making. 
We are concerned about our clients’ safety and we try to advise them as best 
we can, but we are not in the business of predicting future harm. Others, however, 
are. Predicting behavior and lethality assessments are increasingly a part of law 
enforcement and safety planning, and it is useful to take a look at this field.   
 
RISK AND LETHALITY ASSESSMENT AND THE PREDICTABILITY 
 OF VIOLENCE (AND DOES IT MATTER?) 
 
 Legal scholars have devoted a good deal of effort to the question of 
character evidence and how it can help predict behavior.  Much of the discussion 
starts with G.W. Allport, a psychologist, a founder of “trait theory.” Allport believed 
that traits were the most fundamental building blocks of personality.250 Trait theorists 
believed that traits were stable and enduring, and produced generally consistent 
behavior over a variety of situations.251  In the realm of trait theory, a person who 
lies in one situation will lie in other situations; a person who is violent in one 
250 G.W. ALLPORT, PERSONALITY – A PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 286 (1937). 
251 Miguel A. Mendez, Character Evidence Reconsidered: ‘People Do Not Seem to 
be Predictable Characters, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 871 (1998); WALTER MISCHEL, 
PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT 6 (1968). 
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circumstance will likely be violent in other circumstances.252 Trait theory would 
allow us to predict behavior, including criminal behavior. 
 Empirical research did not support the trait theorists.253 Walter Mischel 
found that “behavior depends on stimulus situations and is specific to the situation: 
response patterns even in highly similar situations often fail to be strongly 
related.”254 However, between 1968 and 1995, Mischel, along with his colleague, 
Yuichi Shoda, modified his views on character traits and predictability. Mischel and 
Shoda assert that we can develop a fuller personality profile that includes a variety 
of psychological ingredients, one that could successfully predict particularized 
behavior.255   
  More recently, Professor Edward Imwinkelried asserted that most recent 
studies agree that predicting behavior based on interactions between character traits 
and situations is more accurate than predictions based on either traits or situations. 256 
Since legal scholarship on predictability revolves around the admissibility in court 
of character evidence, a theory “more accurate” is different from “more likely than 
not,” and is not going to result in reconsidering long-standing rules of evidence. The 
question here, however, is whether predictability should inform our representation 
of vulnerable clients.  
252 Mendez, supra note 251. 
253 Id.; MISCHEL, supra note 251. 
254 MISCHEL, supra note 251. 
255 Walter Mischel & Yuichi Shoda, A Cognitive-Affective System of Personality: 
Reconceptualizing Situations, Dispositions, Dynamics, and Invariance in 
Personality Structure, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 246 (1995). 
256 Edward J. Imwinkelried, Reshaping the “Grotesque” Doctrine of Character 
Evidence: The Reform Implications of the Most Recent Psychological Research, 36 
SW. U. L. REV. 741, 754-755, 768 (2008).). 
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Domestic violence is a subset within the broader category of violent crime. 
Many people, including Congress, believe that crimes of sexual violence and child 
molestation deserve special treatment.  To the chagrin of many judges, lawyers, and 
scholars, Congress amended the Federal Rules of Evidence to allow the admission 
of past similar acts in criminal cases in which the defendant is accused of sexual 
assault257 or child molestation,258 and to allow the admission of past similar actions 
for civil actions involving sexual assault or child molestation.259 In a Report 
submitted to Congress in 1995, the Judicial Conference requested that Congress 
reconsider Rules 413, 414, and 415, reporting overwhelming opposition. Two years 
later, Katharine Baker wrote that “Advocates of Rule 413…unabashedly and without 
proof suggest that rapists are more likely than other criminals to repeat their acts.  
The evidence that we have is to the contrary.”260 According to studies by the Bureau 
of Justice Statistics, recidivism for drug offenses, larceny/theft, burglary, and 
robbery are all much higher than rape, sexual assault, and child molestation.  In fact, 
only homicide is lower.261  
That did not deter Congress or the State legislatures of California and 
Illinois, both of which amended their rules of evidence to allow prior acts of domestic 
violence in cases in which the victim was murdered.262 California acted in response 
257 FED. R. EVID. 413. 
258 Id. at 414. 
259 Id. at415. 
260 Katharine K. Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in 
Rape Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1997). 
261 PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994 (June 2003), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf. 
262 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1109 (West 2006); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 115-10.2a 
(West 2012). 
 
62 JOURNAL NAME [VOL. :NNN 
 
to the O.J. Simpson acquittal and Illinois just prior to the Scott Peterson trial, which 
culminated in a conviction. 
The history of predicting criminal behavior is, at best, a cautionary tale.  The 
ancient Greeks, including Aristotle, believed in physiognomy, the ability to predict 
human character by physical appearance.  In the 19th Century, phrenologists believed 
they could predict future criminal behavior by certain bumps on an individual’s head.  
Phrenology was considered by many intellectuals to be a real science.  Bram Stoker 
in Dracula and Arthur Conan Doyle in The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes both refer 
to phrenology with approval.  No less than Holmes himself, the epitome of rational 
thought, authoritatively states that a new acquaintance is intelligent, based on the 
size of his skull. 
Recent popular culture has focused more on the supernatural.  In 1956, 
Philip K. Dick published The Minority Report, a short story in which psychics who 
are able to see the future help the police to prevent murders before the occur.263  The 
“Precrime” unit arrests future perpetrators, who are punished for the crimes they 
would have committed.  Dick placed his story 100 years in the future. The story was 
made into a 2002 movie, with Tom Cruise playing Dick’s 50 year old, balding, out-
of-shape director of “Precrime,” the organization charged with arresting criminals 
before they commit their crime.264 In the television show The Profiler, the 
protagonist, who works for the FBI as a forensic analyst, is particularly effective 
because of her ability to see through the eyes of others. The more recent trend, 
263 PHILIP K. DICK, THE MINORITY REPORT (1956) (first published in FANTASTIC 
UNIVERSE and has been republished since in several anthologies of Philip Dick’s 
work). 
264 Directed by Steven Spielberg as a joint venture between DreamWorks, Amblin 
Entertainment, and 20th Century Fox (2002). 
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however, is toward a real-world ability to predict crime, through computer-assisted 
analysis, as in Person of Interest, or mathematics, as in Numbers. 
The real world has caught up, and predicting future crimes has entered the 
mainstream.  The Santa Cruz, California police department is using “predictive” 
software, using an algorithm similar to the program used to predict earthquake 
aftershocks.265  Based on the findings of Santa Clara Assistant Professor George 
Mohler that offenders tend to return to the scene of past successes, the software 
predicts the location where another crime is likely to occur.266 On April 12, 2012, 
CBS News reported that Los Angeles joined the “predictive policing” movement, 
with officers patrolling computer-generated hot spots to prevent crimes before they 
occurred.267 These and similar efforts are mundane when compared to the 
Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Future Attribute Screening Technology 
(FAST) program. 
FAST’s goal, as stated in a December 2011 DHS privacy impact 
assessment, is to “determine whether technology can enable the identification and 
interpretation of a screened subject’s physiological and behavioral cues or signatures 
without the need for operator-induced stimuli which, in turn, will allow for security 
personnel to remotely (and therefore, more safely) identify cues diagnostic of 
malintent (defined as the intent to cause harm).”268 In other words, FAST has been 
265 Heather Kelly, Police Embracing Tech that Predicts Crimes, CNN TECH, (4:59pm 
EDT, July 9, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/09/tech/innovation/police-tech/. 
266 Greg Risling, Sci-fi Policing: Predicting Crime Before it Occurs, YAHOO! NEWS, 
(12:14pm, July 1, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/sci-fi-policing-predicting-crime-
occurs-150157831.html. 
267 Bob Orr, LAPD Computer Program Prevents Crime by Predicting It, CBS 
EVENING NEWS, (8:40pm, April 11, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/lapd-
computer-program-prevents-crime-by-predicting-it/. 
268 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, FUTURE ATTRIBUTE SCREENING 
TECHNOLOGY (FAST) /PASSIVE METHODS FOR PRECISION BEHAVIORAL SCREENING 
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created to identify criminals before they commit crimes, and it is no surprise that 
DHS identifies FAST as a “pre-crime” system,” or that many commentators have 
compared it to Minority Report and Person of Interest.269 
 
Causation and prediction hold a great deal of interest in the domestic 
violence field.  Domestic violence counselors are well-acquainted with the Power 
and Control Wheel, developed in 1984 by the Domestic Abuse Intervention Project 
in Duluth, Minnesota.270  The Wheel is a diagnostic tool to help characterize and 
explain abusive relationships, including domestic violence, and its use has become 
part of the culture of identifying abusive relationship and counseling victims.271   
As described by its founders, the Wheel is used in a variety of settings, 
including assisting battered women to see how their abusers’ tactics are used against 
them and better understand the batterers’ control, to counsel men to identify their 
own behavior, and to train law enforcement on the nature of the abusive relationships 
and to better understand why women may not want to leave the relationship.272 The 
Power and Control Wheel is probably the most commonly used interpretive tool in 
the field of intimate violence, but it rarely, if ever, is used to predict violence. 
 One of the earliest and best-known tools for predicting lethality is Jacquelyn 
Campbell’s Danger Assessment (DA), first developed in 1985, and revised several 
2, available at, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_st_fast-
a.pdf. 
269 Declan McCullagh, Homeland Security Moves Forward with ‘Pre-Crime’ 
Detection, CNET (4:00am PDT, October 7, 2011), www.news.cnet.com/8301-
31921_3-20117058-281/homeland-security. 
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times since.273  It consists of a two-step assessment to determine a woman’s lethality 
risk.  First, the woman is presented with a calendar on which she documents all 
incidents of abuse during the previous twelve months.  This allows the victim to see 
a graphical depiction of her abuse and illustrates the abuser’s patterns of abuse.  
Second, the woman answers a series of twenty yes-or-no questions.  The greater the 
number of “yes” responses, the greater the woman’s risk of being killed by her 
battering intimate partner.  The Danger Assessment is easily accessed, and women 
or those assisting them can complete can complete it online.274  A shorter, eleven-
question Danger Assessment test is also available for law enforcement use when 
responding to domestic disputes or battering incidents.275   
In the 1980’s, Gavin de Becker developed the MOSAIC Threat Assessment 
System, which, in its current computer-assisted form, is used by law enforcement 
agencies, including the Supreme Court Police and U.S. Capitol Police, to assess 
threats to public figures and others.276 De Becker developed different MOSAIC 
273 Jacquelyn Campbell et al., The Danger Assessment: Validation of Lethality Risk 
Assessment Instrument for Intimate Partner Femicide, 24 J. INTERPERS. VIOLENCE 
653, 657, 661-662 (2009); Lisa A. Goodman et al., Predicting Repeat Abuse Among 
Arrested Batterers: Use of the Danger Assessment Scale in the Criminal Justice 
System, 15 J. INTERPERS. VIOLENCE 63, 65 (2000).   
274 DANGER ASSESSMENT, www.dangerassessment.com. 
275 See, e.g., MARYLAND NETWORK AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, LETHALITY 
ASSESSMENT PROGRAM FOR FIRST RESPONDERS, available at 
http://www.bwjp.org/files/bwjp/files/MD_LAP_Packetwebsite.pdf. For an in-depth 
exploration of when the Danger Assessment may be admissible in court or useful to 
attorneys, see Amanda Hitt & Lynn McLain, Stop the Killing: Potential Courtroom 
Use of a Questionnaire that Predicts the Likelihood that a Victim of Intimate Partner 
Violence Will Be Murdered By Her Partner, 24 WIS. J. L. GENDER, & SOC’Y 277 
(2009). 
276 De Becker’s web site included endorsements from several public officials, 
including Dennis Chapas. Tracy Johnson, Software Assesses Likelihood of Crime, 
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systems for a variety of situations, including domestic violence. De Becker argues 
that “[s]pousal homicide is the single most predictable serious crime in America….  
[T]here is an urgent need to help police, prosecutors, and victims systematically 
evaluate cases to identify those with the ingredients of true danger.”277  De Becker’s 
domestic violence tool is MOSAIC-20, a computer program that helps police to 
evaluate cases to identify those in which the danger of homicide is highest. 
In 1997, Gavin de Becker published The Gift of Fear and Other Survival 
Signs that Protect Us from Violence.278 The Gift of Fear was lauded by commentators 
from Oprah Winfrey to Marcia Clark to many domestic violence victims who felt 
that the book spoke to their experiences.279  Even those reviewers who did not like 
the writing or felt that De Becker was a pompous self-promoter praised the book’s 
message.280  The Gift of Fear spent four months on the New York Times best-seller 
list and was the #1 non-fiction seller of 1997.281  It was followed by other successful 
De Becker books on fear and security.282  Oprah now offers De Becker’s MOSAIC-
20 free of charge on her website, touting it as “the tool that could save your life.”283   
277 GAVIN DE BECKER, THE GIFT OF FEAR 201 (1997). 
278 Id. 
279 Id.; see also, e.g., OPRAH, http://www.oprah.com/relationships/Trusting-Your-
Intuition-Could-Save-Your-Life (last visited Feb. 27, 2014) (episode aired Jan. 29, 
2008); GAVIN DE BECKER & ASSOCIATES, 
http://gavindebecker.com/who_we_are/what_others_say (last visited Feb. 27, 2014). 
280 DE BECKER, supra note 277. 
281 GAVIN DE BECKER & ASSOCIATES, http://gavindebecker.com/. 
282 See, e.g., GAVIN DE BECKER ET AL., JUST 2 SECONDS (2008); GAVIN DE BECKER, 
FEAR LESS: REAL TRUTH ABOUT RISK, SAFETY, AND SECURITY IN A TIME OF 
TERRORISM (2002); PROTECTING THE GIFT: KEEPING CHILDREN AND TEENAGERS 
SAFE (AND PARENTS SANE) (2002); DE BECKER, supra note 277. 
283 Oprah, MOSAIC: The Tool that Could Save Your Life, 
http://www.oprah.com/oprahshow/MOSAIC-Gavin-de-Beckers-Online-Threat-
Assessment-Tool (last visited Feb. 27, 2014).     
 
67  IMPOSSIBLE CHOICES  
 
The Danger Assessment and MOSAIC-20 are designed to predict lethal 
violence or “extreme dangerousness.”284  There are other risk assessment 
instruments, such as the Kingston Screening Instrument for Domestic Violence (K-
SID) and the Domestic Violence Screening Instrument (DVSI), which were designed 
to diagnose the risk of repeat assault at any level.285  Other instruments that assess 
risk of reassault include the Spousal Assault Risk Assessment (SARA)286 and the 
Ontario Domestic Violence Risk Assessment (ODARA).287  
The Kingston Screening Instrument for Domestic Violence (K-SID) was 
developed in 1998 by Richard Gelles.  The K-SID method is a ten-question survey 
that is provided to both the victim and abuser and is comprised of three parts: (1) a 
poverty chart; (2) a severity and injury index; and (3) ten risk markers: poverty, age, 
drugs/alcohol, domestic violence in family of origin, witness to domestic violence as 
a child, marital status, child abuse by defendant, education, employment, previous 
domestic violence arrests, and violations of protective orders.  The test scores the 
batterer as being at a low, moderate, high, or very high “risk of reoffending.”  If a 
284 JANICE E. ROEHL ET AL., INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT 
VALIDATION STUDY, Final Report (Mar. 28, 2005) (unpublished research report), 
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/209731.pdf.  
285 Id. 
286 SPOUSAL ASSAULT RISK ASSESSMENT (SARA), 
http://www.biscmi.org/documents/Spousal_Assault_Risk_Assessment.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2014); P. Randall Kropp & Stephen D. Hart, The Spousal Risk 
Assessment (SARA) Guide: Reliability and Validity in Adult Male Offenders, in RISK 
REDUCTION: INTERVENTIONS FOR SPECIAL NEEDS OFFENDERS (Harry E. Allen, ed. 
2002).   
287 See N. Zoe Hilton et al., A Brief Actuarial Assessment for the Prediction of Wife 
Assault Recidivism: The Ontario Domestic Assault Risk Assessment, 16 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT, 267 (2004). 
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batterer has a previous domestic violence arrest or has violated a protective order, 
they are automatically classified as being at a “very high” risk of reoffense.288   
 The Domestic Violence Screening Instrument (DVSI) includes twelve 
questions that are intended to indicate the batterer’s level of dangerousness.   Like 
the K-SID, this method is not widely available for public use.289  The DVSI is based 
upon information received from the abuser, rather than the victim, which 
differentiates it from the Danger Assessment or DV-MOSAIC methods.290    The 
DVSI is administered when a domestic violence offender makes initial contact with 
criminal justice professionals, or at the beginning of his probation.  The offender is 
then classified at a particular risk level.  Where the DVSI is used, it can serve as a 
tool during the supervision of the offender or the provision of specific services to the 
offender and victim.291  
 In 2005, the National Institute of Justice surveyed the accuracy of the four 
primary lethality assessment methods: DA, DV-MOSAIC, DVSI, and K-SID.  The 
National Institute of Justice report indicates that, overall, “all four of the risk 
assessment tools were significantly related to subsequent severity of abuse, but not 
very highly related.”292  A study of DVSI usage between 2003-2007 found that the 
288 Jan Roehl & Kristin Guertin, Intimate Partner Violence: The Current Use of Risk 
Assessments in Sentencing Offenders, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 171, 179, 181 (2000); see also 
Harrington Conner, supra note 125, at 920. 
289 Harrington Conner, supra note 125, at 920. 
290 Id. 
291 See Kirk R. Williams & Stephen R. Grant, Empirically Examining the Risk of 
Intimate Partner Violence: The Revised Domestic Violence Screening Instrument 
(DVSI-R), 121 PUB. HEALTH REP. 400 (2006). 
292 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, CRIME, VIOLENCE & VICTIMIZATION 
RESEARCH DIVISION’S COMPENDIUM OF RESEARCH ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
1993-2011, at 2B (2012). Jill Theresa Messing et al., Collaborating With Police 
Departments: Recruitment in the Oklahoma Lethality Assessment (Ok-LA) Study, 17 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 163 (2011). 
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predictive value recidivism of the DVSI across all risk groups was not statistically 
significant.293 
The very existence of lethality and risk assessment tools reveals distrust in 
domestic violence victims’ ability to understand their situations or predict their risk 
of being reassaulted or murdered.  These instruments arise from the belief that “most 
people do a poor job of evaluating their own risk for negative outcomes.”294  Some 
researchers believe that domestic violence victims are deficient in recognizing 
danger in domestic violence relationships.295  Other commentators believe that 
victims cannot predict future violence even with the aid of risk assessment 
instruments because “there is no real way to predict unpredictable behavior.”296 
Contrary to the claims of the various risk assessment tools, victims are 
generally the best predictors of their own risk of being seriously injured.297  Victims 
have a unique ability to predict the violence and anticipate the degree of violence.298  
Studies show that domestic violence victims’ ratings of their risk of future violence 
committed by an intimate partner are fairly accurate.299  Almost 65% of domestic 
293 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE & VICTIMIZATION RESEARCH 
DIVISION’S COMPENDIUM OF RESEARCH ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1993-2011, 
at 2B (2012); Jill Theresa Messing et al., Collaborating With Police Departments: 
Recruitment in the Oklahoma Lethality Assessment (Ok-LA) Study, 17 VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 163 (2011). 
294 Jennifer K. Connor-Smith et al., Risk Assessments by Female Victims of Intimate 
Partner Violence: Predictors of Risk Perceptions and Comparison to an Actuarial 
Measure, 26 J. INTERPERS. VIOLENCE 2517, 2519 (2011). 
295 Tricia H. Witte & Rachel Kendra, Risk Recognition and Intimate Partner 
Violence, 25 J. INTERPERS. VIOLENCE 2199, 2212 (2010). 
296 Id. (emphasis in original). 
297 Arlene N. Weisz et al., Assessing the Risk of Severe Domestic Violence: The 
Importance of Survivors’ Predictions, 15 J. INTERPERS. VIOLENCE 75, 81 (2000); 
DAVIES ET AL. supra note 20 at 2. 
298 Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women’s Self-Defense Work 
and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 14 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 213, 
240 (1992); Jones, supra note 125, at 627. 
299 Witte & Kendra, supra note 295, at 2200. 
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violence victims accurately predict their risk of reassault.300  Victims may not 
accurately predict lethal violence, however.  In one study, only approximately half 
of victims of intimate partner homicide or attempted homicide recognized that their 
abusers were capable of killing them.301   
In judging risk, victims use different factors than those utilized by risk 
assessment tools, including interpretations of the abuser’s moods, facial expressions, 
speech patterns, and verbal threats.302  They also rely on abuser personality traits and 
dynamic factors like the abuser’s ability to find the victim and his desire for 
revenge.303  These factors are difficult for risk assessment tools to capture.  Victims 
also will rely on some of the same factors used by assessment tools to predict 
violence, including the status of the relationship, the history of violence in the 
relationship, and substance use.304  Some of the instruments’ primary indicators – 
like the abuser’s criminal history, the abuser being in a stepparent role, or the 
presence of stepchildren in the home – play almost no role in victim prediction.305  
Studies have shown that victims’ perceptions of the risk of reassault using these 
factors and others improve predictions of reassault by the risk assessment 
instruments.306   
300 Witte & Kendra, supra note 295, at 2201. 
301 Jacqueline Campbell et al., Assessing Risk Factors for Intimate Partner 
Homicide, 250 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 14 (2003). 
302 Witte & Kendra, supra note 295, at 2200 (internal citations omitted). 
303 Connor-Smith et al., supra note 294, at 2531. 
304 Witte & Kendra, supra note 295, at 2200 (internal citations omitted). 
305 Connor-Smith et al., supra note 294, at 2543, 2531. 
306 Witte & Kendra, supra note 295, at 2200; Weisz et al., supra note 297, at 86; D. 
Alex Heckert & Edward W. Gondolf, Battered Women’s Perceptions of Risk Versus 
Risk Factors and Instruments in Predicting Repeat Reassault, 19 J. INTERPERS. 
VIOLENCE 778, 797 (2004).       
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In fact, lethality assessments generally incorporate the victim’s own 
assessment of risk, bolstering the effectiveness of the instrument.  For example, the 
first risk factor listed for MOSAIC 20 is “The woman has intuitive feelings that she 
is at risk.”307  This factor is the only one to appear in italics, adding emphasis to its 
importance to the assessment.  The final factor for MOSAIC 20 is:  “His wife/partner 
fears he will injure or kill her.  She has discussed this with others or has made plans 
to be carried out in the event of her death.”308  Like the first factor, this factor supports 
the importance of victim prediction in risk assessment and incorporates victim 
prediction into the instrument.  Campbell’s Danger Assessment also incorporates 
victim risk assessment into its instrument.  The eighteenth factor in the Danger 
Assessment is “Do you believe he is capable of killing you?”309  Studies show that 
incorporating the victim’s assessment of danger improves instrument prediction.310   
One study revealed that victims’ perceptions of risk were better at 
predicting reassault than the K-SID but that the Danger Assessment was more 
accurate at predicting reassault than the victims themselves.311  With these outcomes 
in mind, the authors of the study found that women’s perceptions of risk are a 
“reasonably accurate predictor of reassault.”312  Interestingly the study found that a 
victim’s risk was to some extent determined by the victim’s perception of the risk.  
The victims who were at greatest risk of future harm were those who felt somewhat 
safe and therefore did not take proactive action, such as separating from the abuser 
307 MOSAIC, https://www.mosaicmethod.com (last visited Feb. 5, 2014).   
308 Id.   
309 DANGER ASSESSMENT, http://www.dangerassessment.org (last visited Mar. 2, 
2014). 
310 Weisz et al., supra note 297, at 86; Heckert & Gondolf, supra note 306, at 797.    
311 Heckert & Gondolf, supra note 306, at 796-797.    
312 Id. at 796.    
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or safety planning, to ensure safety.313  Victims who felt safe, victims who felt like 
they were in danger, and victims who did not know whether they were at risk were 
less likely to be reassaulted.314 
It is not the purpose of this paper to opine on whether MOSAIC-20, the 
DVSI, or any other instrument can accurately predict serious or lethal intimate 
partner violence (nor do we have the capacity to do so), but it is fair to assume that 
these efforts will become increasingly sophisticated, and the implications are 
dramatic. The notion of law enforcement profiling as a preventative tool is well-
established, and there is a great deal of literature on the value, or lack thereof, of 
profiling.  Our question is different.  Even assuming that the perfect profiling tool 
exists, does it affect the attorney-client relationship? Put another way, when we talk 
about the attorney-client relationship, particularly in the context of client-centered 
lawyering, we take for granted that the lawyer takes direction from the competent 
client.  Can we maintain that presumption if we believe MOSAIC-20 is an accurate 
assessor and MOSAIC-20 tells us that an abuser is about to commit “the single most 
predictable serious crime in America?”315 
Murder can be the ultimate form of control.  Through the threat of murder, 
the abuser leverages everything the victim has – her access to work, her children, 
and the world.  Prior domestic violence is the single greatest predictor of femicide 
by an intimate partner.  In one study, seventy percent of female murder victims had 
been physically abused by the same intimate partner who killed them.316  Thirty-nine 
313 Id. at 797. 
314 Id.     
315 DE BECKER, supra note 277. 
316 Campbell et al., supra note 82, at 1091.  Of femicide victims ages 18 to 50, 
seventy-nine percent were murdered by an intimate partner who committed prior 
domestic violence against them.  Id. 
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percent of all femicides, and probably even more, are committed by an intimate 
partner.317  In another study, domestic violence homicide victims had experienced 
violence within 30 days of the homicide, some within a day or two before the 
homicide.318 
Most domestic violence attorneys fear that the next news item about 
domestic violence homicide will feature one of their clients.  While attorneys should 
be concerned about the potential for lethal violence against their clients, this fear is 
misdirected.  The lawyer’s own worries about her role or responsibility in the client’s 
safety must give way to the client’s interests.   
 
CONCLUSION 
We approached this paper as practicing lawyers and clinical teachers, 
looking at a problem that domestic violence victims and advocates face every day. 
Given the many vagaries of the Rules of Professional Responsibility and the basic 
agency role of the lawyer, it is not surprising that our own discipline offered little 
help. Does anything else matter? We think that is a fair question.  
In writing this paper, we have come full circle.  The project started with a 
post hoc reflection of our actions in Sarah’s case.  As is evident from the paper, each 
question led to new questions, some of which were unexpected.  All domestic 
violence practitioners are conscious of the nightmare scenario inherent in their cases, 
and we are no different.  We are aware that Sarah’s case could have turned out 
317 SHANNAN CATALANO, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INTIMATE PARTNER 
VIOLENCE: ATTRIBUTES OF VICTIMIZATION, 1993-2001, Special Report, 3 (Nov. 
2013).  Twenty-four percent of femicides are committed by an unknown perpetrator. 
Id.  Almost certainly some of these “unknown” assailants include domestic violence 
perpetrators. 
318 Block, supra note 100, at II-4-5.   
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differently.  That is a sobering thought, and, in the clinical context, we asked 
ourselves whether students should be put into the position of being in the front lines 
of a case that has the potential to be so devastating.   
In the end, we came back to where we started.  While we do not discount 
the effect of a positive result for the client on our views, we believe strongly that our 
commitment to our client included the trust in her ability and judgment to make the 
decision to argue that her husband should not be incarcerated, and that our 
commitment to our students included sharing the full responsibilities of our 
representation.  In making the latter conclusion, we are informed—and impressed—
by our students’ views.  We discussed these issues with them, and as is evident from 
their g-chat, they discussed the issues with each other.  That said, we have three 
caveats. 
First, we and our students benefitted from a multi-disciplinary approach, 
which included classes by psychiatrists and social workers on the nature of domestic 
violence, along with the opportunity to consult with the same professionals on cases.  
We encouraged students to use these opportunities to talk about their own concerns, 
and provided the opportunity to do so in confidential settings.  This is not a luxury; 
we think it is a critical part of clinical work in domestic violence.  
Second, we cannot underestimate that benefit to both clients and students 
of having students working on the same case for at least two semesters, with the 
opportunity to continue longer, especially for the purpose of continuing with an 
existing client.  During our representation of Sarah, our students prepared, filed, 
mediated, and litigated motions and the trial; defended an appeal; prepared and filed 
a successful petition for Innocent Spouse tax relief; negotiated forbearance on a 
mortgage foreclosure; negotiated forbearance and obtained a court-ordered title 
75  IMPOSSIBLE CHOICES  
 
transfer on an automobile; talked with accountants, bankers, psychiatrists, social 
workers, victim advocates, court mediators, and lawyers; and generally lived with 
the case throughout law school. They appeared in court numerous times, before four 
judges, and, by the time the graduated, were greeted warmly in the courthouse by 
state marshals, family relations advisors, and court clerks. As Sarah mentioned 
several times, the relationship she built with Mary and Sarah provided relief at times 
of stress. It would have been difficult to change students every semester.  
Third, as Professor Carey has written elsewhere,319 we continue to believe 
in the need to provide holistic services, with a full range of legal services. We believe 
our obligation to our client is to use our skills to try to solve her problems and our 
obligation to our students is to teach the skills necessary to make that effort. There 
are cases that conclude with the granting of a restraining order, but many cases 
involve other family issues as well as collateral legal issues arising from the breakup 
of the relationship.  If we are truly committed to teaching best practices, we need to 
be willing to provide the highest quality services. In the case of domestic violence, 
obtaining a restraining order without resolving child custody, support, and other 
critical family issues will inevitably leave many clients at a loss. When we limit our 
representation in this way, we start from the proposition that we are not intending to 
resolve the client’s problem.  The message to students is that skills are enough. We 
should be striving for higher standards. 
319 Camille Carey, Correcting Myopia in Domestic Violence Advocacy: Moving 
Forward in Lawyering and Law School Clinics, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 220 
(2011). 
 
